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Abstract 
The moderating effects of embodied cognition and uncertainty orientation were examined 
in relation to the confirmation bias. Specifically, the alternate movement of both hands 
palms up, which often accompanies the expression “on the one hand, and on the other” 
relating to the weighing of an argument, was manipulated.  Uncertainty orientation 
distinguishes between people who are uncertainty-oriented (UOs), that 
confront uncertainty with the intention of resolving it, and people who are oriented 
toward certainty (COs), in that they attempt to maintain certainty, by creating a 
predictable environment.  A predicted significant interaction was found for attitude 
polarization and a marginal effect was found for selective exposure, but the latter was 
found only for women. Several other dependent measures did not yield predicted results. 
Nevertheless, the study does show a link between uncertainty orientation and 
embodiment effects. Implications are discussed. 
Keywords: uncertainty orientation, embodied cognition, conceptual metaphor, 
confirmation bias, attitudes, motivation 
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The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion draws all 
things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater 
number and weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it 
either neglects or despises, or else by some distinction sets aside or reject, in 
order that by this great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its 
former conclusion may remain inviolate. 
           Sir Francis Bacon, 1620 
 
 
The understanding that our attitudes can have a biasing effect on information processing 
has a long history, as the above quotation would suggest.  This biasing effect has been 
linked to many other processes in social psychology such as resistance to changing 
stereotypes (Allport, 1954; Sherman, Allen,& Sacchi, 2012), the persistence of illusory 
correlations, (Chapman & Chapman, 1967), self-fulfilling prophecies (Rosenhan, 1973),  
and self-verification (Swann, Pelham, Krull, & Douglas, 1989).  It has also been cited as 
a problem in economics and finance (Pompian, 2006), medicine (Nickerson, 1998), law 
and politics (Myers & Lamm, 1976; Loftus, Greene,& Doyle, 1989; Taber & Lodge, 
2006), real estate (Kempton, Alani, & Chapman, 2002) and in scientific reasoning and 
methodology (Nickerson, 1998; Mahoney, 1977).  Despite the pervasiveness of this 
psychological tendency and the understanding of factors that contribute to it, little 
research has investigated ways to lessen its effect.    
 The current research was conducted to examine the moderating effects of 
uncertainty-orientation and embodied cognition on this biasing effect of attitudes on 
information processing.  In addition this research is designed to provide insights into the 
mechanisms of embodied cognition by examining individual differences. 
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The Confirmation Bias 
 Underlying Mechanisms.  Whether voting for a politician, deciding which car to 
buy, or determining if a criminal is guilty, the need to think critically, weigh evidence 
objectively, and make appropriate decisions permeates our daily lives and our most 
important responsibilities. However, these tasks are rendered difficult by a particularly 
powerful psychological phenomenon known as the confirmation bias.   Klayman (1995) 
argued that there are about as many operational definitions of the term, confirmation bias, 
as there are studies that explore it. The confirmation bias, as it was initially conceived, is 
the tendency for people to seek evidence favouring one’s already existing hypotheses 
(Wason, 1960).  However, recent interpretations have used the confirmation bias to refer 
to a variety of behaviours such as searching for congruent information (Jonas, Shulz-
Hardt, Frey,& Thelen, 2001) or the tendency to interpret ambiguous evidence in favour of 
one’s beliefs and to ignore or reinterpret evidence unfavourable to them (Nickerson, 
1998; Perfors & Navarra, 2009; Oswald & Grosjean, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988).  
Thus, the term confirmation bias is defined here as the seeking and interpreting of 
evidence in ways that confirm existing attitudes, beliefs or expectations (Nickerson, 
1998; Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
It is important to note that the issues surrounding the operational definition of the 
term confirmation bias may be, at least in part, due to the distinction between motivated 
and unmotivated forms of the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998).  Although this paper 
focuses primarily on the former, the latter should be addressed.  People tend to search for 
and overweight positive confirmatory evidence even when there is no vested interest.  For 
example, as early as 1956, Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin showed that participants would 
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only search for examples that would provide instances if their hypothesis was correct.  In 
Wason’s (1960) 2-4-6 task, he showed further evidence of individuals only asking 
questions that were thought to yield positive answers.  Further research (Mynatt, 
Doherty,& Tweney, 1977; Wason, 1968) have showed that individuals do not only have 
an inclination to test positive-yielding questions, but also a bias in interpreting ambiguous 
answers that would yield a positive answer.   
This more cognitive view has also been used to explain the motivated findings of 
the confirmation bias.  Although early research regarding such reasoning took for granted 
that motivation may cause people to make decisions in a self-serving way (e.g. attribution 
theory; Weiner, 1972; Heider, 1958), this view came under attack during the cognitive 
revolution when it was suggested that many of the findings could be interpreted using 
strictly cognitive (and non-motivational) theory (Miller & Ross, 1975; Bem, 1967; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980). As such, evidence that was purported to support motivated 
reasoning was simply recast as a function of biased information processing.   Nisbett and 
Ross (1980) have argued that motivational commitment to strongly held beliefs tells us 
nothing about the precise cognitive mechanisms by which individuals seek and interpret 
evidence.   Instead, Ross and colleagues (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Miller & Ross, 1975; 
Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975) argued for a purely information-processing explanation.    
Cognitive theorists argue that biases are the result of rational, but imperfect, inferential 
processes.  
It should be noted here that under both the cognitive and motivational view, 
individuals are not intentionally choosing to be biased, but rather, the biases are often 
uncontrollable and unconscious. Similarly, even when individuals know about the 
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potential of bias, it is difficult to know what the magnitude of the bias will be,and as such 
properly correcting for it is extremely challenging (Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002). 
Under the cognitive view, people seek and interpret evidence due to cognitive 
biases and heuristics.  Judgmental errors do not arise due to motivational or emotional 
reasons, but rather, they form primarily from non-motivational information processing 
strategies.    For example, individuals search for consistent information because 
consistent information is more accessible or because people typically use a positive test 
strategy heuristic (Klayman & Ha, 1987).  For example, in one study (Snyder & Swann, 
1978) participants were asked to test whether a person was an introvert or an extrovert.  
They were allowed to select questions from a possible list that asked about introverted 
behaviours or extroverted behaviours.  The results from this study and others (Devine, 
Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990; Hodgins & Zuckerman, 1993; Swann& Read, 1981; Snyder, 1981) 
have demonstrated that individuals prefer to ask questions that are consistent with their 
hypotheses.  For example, if asked to determine whether a person is an extrovert,  
participants prefer questions such as ‘are you usually the initiator of forming new 
relationships’ as opposed to ‘do you usually go to movies alone.’ 
In 1979, Lord, Ross, and Lepper, ran an experiment with participants who had 
strong beliefs in favour of or against capital punishment.  Each participant 
readdescriptions of two studies; one that confirmed their pre-existing beliefs about the 
deterrent efficacy of the death penalty and one that disconfirming their beliefs 
(counterbalanced). Participantsreada detailed account of each study's procedure and 
participants had to rate how well-conducted and convincing the research was.  As 
predicted, both proponents and opponents of capital punishment rated attitude congruent 
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results as more convincing whereas they reported the opposing studies as problematic in 
terms of methodology.  Under a purely cognitive view, these results are interpreted such 
that individuals draw these conclusions not because of any inherent motivation but 
because they appear more plausible given one’s prior beliefs, attitudes, and expectancies.  
This asymmetrical criteria for supportive and opposing information is then a function of 
the fact that people evaluate evidence as stronger  if they believe them to be ‘right,’ 
(Lord, 1989), if it is processed more fluently due to familiarity  (Whittlesea, 1993), or 
because it is difficult to gather information for multiple hypotheses at the same time 
(Tweney et al., 1983). 
The cognitive view came under criticism with a return to a motivational 
perspective (Kunda, 1990; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; 
Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991).  Under this view, 
motivation affects reasoning by drawing on a biased set of cognitive processes; thus 
purporting the motivation versus cognition debate to be a false dichotomy.  Rather than 
conceptualizing motivation and cognition as distinct processes,  motivation can be seen 
as synergistic with cognition (Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986; Kruglanski et al., 
2002).Kunda (1990) suggested, "people rely on cognitive processes and representations 
to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of  
these will be used on a given occasion" (p. 480).  For example, individuals who have the 
motivation to be accurate will draw on processes that facilitate a correct conclusion, 
whereas individuals who have a motivation to arrive at a desired conclusion will draw on 
cognitive mechanisms that help facilitate that goal.  In other words, as Bargh and 
colleagues (2001) noted, “however a goal is activated, either by conscious or 
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nonconscious means, it will operate effectively to guide a person's goal-relevant 
cognition, affect, and behavior from that point on.” (p.1015). 
  Pyszcynski and Greenberg’s (1987) biased hypothesis testing model is very 
similar but focuses on the self-serving aspect of biasing in which bias occurs at each 
stage of the testing sequence, such as the selection of the hypothesis, the search for 
evidence, the  evaluation of evidence, and the amount of evidence one requires to make a 
conclusion.  Indeed, Kunda (1990) argued that her paper is an extension of the biased 
hypothesis testing model but adds that other goals, such as the motive to be accurate 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Johnston, 1996; Chaiken et al., 1989) can shape how 
information is searched.  
Under this perspective, what motivation an individual has will affect the cognitive 
strategies one uses.  For example, the work by Kruglanski and Freund (1983) 
demonstrates a good example of accuracy motivation. They showed that individuals who 
feared that their judgments would be evaluated for errors showed fewer errors due to 
primacy effects, ethnic stereotyping and anchoring.   Additionally, Tetlock (1985) 
showed that individuals who had to justify their impressions of an essay writer in a 
typical attitude-attribution paradigm (Heider, 1958) were more likely to be sensitive to 
situational factors and thus showed a decrease in the fundamental attribution error effect.  
In addition, Trope and Liberman (1996) argue that general desire to reduce uncertainty is 
what motivates people to question and test their hypotheses, with larger levels of 
uncertainty leading to more diagnostic processing 
With respect to the confirmation bias, a desired conclusion creates directional 
goals and will bias reasoning by affecting the information that becomes accessible, bias 
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conclusions by determining when to stop searching for information, and bias inferential 
rules.   In other words, motivation provides the initial trigger and a biased set of cognitive 
processes take over (Perkins, Faraday, and Bushey, 1991; Baumeister & Newman, 1994).  
As such, people are more likely to recall specific details from memory and will be faster 
in their recall when motivated to do so (Sanitioso et al., 1990). Another conceptualization 
suggests that when motivated to agree with something, people essentially ask ‘can I 
believe this?’ which allows for a more permissive standard for evidence.  However, when 
motivated to disagree with a hypothesis, people implicitly ask ‘must I believe this?’ and 
tend to search through as much evidence in order to disconfirm it (Dawson, Gilovich, & 
Regan., 2002). 
One of the main processes underlying this motivational bias is cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Kunda, 1990; Munro & Ditto, 1997).  Recent examinations 
of dissonance paradigms have revealed that dissonance occurs in response to a threat to 
the self or to one’s self-consistency
1
 (Aronson, 1968; Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; 
Steele, 1988; Tesser, 2000), As such the confirmation bias can also be seen as a function 
self-enhancing and self-protection motives (von Hippel, Laking, & Shakarchi, 2005; 
Tesser, 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Beach, Cornell, & Collins, 2000).  Cherished beliefs are 
often held as an important aspect of one’s self (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Skitka, 
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005) and when presented with dissonant information, this creates a 
state of arousal.  As such, people tend to neutralize these threats, reduce the dissonance, 
and restore consonance by evaluating information in a defensive and biased way 
                                                        
1
although a number of other models have been hypothesized to explain dissonance effects e.g.the Aversive 
Consequences Model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984) or the Action-Orientation Model (Harmon-Jones, 
Gerdjikov,& Harmon-Jones, 2008).   
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(Pyszcynski &Greenberg, 1987; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Dunning, Leuenberger & 
Sherman, 1995). Because of this, one can protect against this threat through self-
affirmation (Steele, 1988; Sherman, Nelson,& Steele, 2000). This perspective suggests 
that affirmation makes additional sources of the self accessible and subsequently reduces 
the need to defend it in a biased way.   For example,Cohen, Aronson and Steele (2000) as 
well as Correl and colleagues (2004) showed that when individuals self-affirmed, by 
focusing on other important traits, they were more persuaded by information challenging 
their views than when they were not affirmed.  Furthermore, Munro and Stansbury 
(2009) have shown that affirming individuals prior to giving them threatening 
information reduces their motivation to disconfirm it.   
Thus two goals, accuracy and directionality are viewed as two important motives 
underlying information search.  This tradeoff between accuracy and directional goals led 
to the idea that the confirmation bias is “motivated by the cost of inferential errors 
relative to the cost of information” (Trope & Liberman, 1996, p.240).  Thus, accuracy 
and directional bias are two coexisting properties, and how much one is motivated to 
avoid an accuracy error and how motivated an individual is to keep a consonant world 
view can be seen as two competing motivations.  
Research has demonstrated (Tetlock, 1992; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998; Jonas & 
Frey, 2003) that by increasing the importance of a situation or of a decision, individuals 
will be more likely to focus on accuracy goals, and be less likely to exhibit a directional 
bias.  Consider that in typical dissonance paradigms, attitude change does not reverse, it 
merely becomes weakened. Thus, it is suggested that when determining one’s post-
dissonance attitude, people are motivated to be biased in their search for and overweight 
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behaviour-congruent evidence.   Note though that this search, although biased, is still a 
subset of all relevant evidence and beliefs, so that people can maintain what Pyszczynski 
& Greenberg (1987) call an illusion of objectivity.   Some evidence comes from research 
examining evaluations of others whereby participants were to play a history trivia game.  
Participants were then told about a person who received a perfect score on a prior task 
and were told that they were set to be their partner or their competitor.  Participants who 
were set to have this person as a partner rated this person as being better at history than 
those who were set to have them as an opponent, presumably because in the former 
condition they wanted this target person to have high ability. However, it is important to 
note that even when the participants wanted this person to have low ability (e.g. in the 
competitor condition), participants still rated their ability level fairly high, suggesting that 
people are constrained by information and accuracy motives (Klein & Kunda, 1989). 
These theories have also received support from neuroscience.  Research on what 
neural areas are associated with the confirmation bias showed that the regions activated 
were not associated with previously recognized cold reasoning (Westen, Blagov, 
Harenski, Kilts,& Hamann, 2006).   In this paper, participants were given threatening 
information about their preferred 2004 electoral candidate.  Participants showed 
heightened activity in areas linked with emotion regulation (Oschner & Gross, 2005).  
The authors suggest that motivated reasoning is distinct from other forms of reasoning.  
Additionally, work by Van Veen, Krug, Schooler and Carter (2009) has shown that these 
same areas were active during a cognitive dissonance task, and the amount of activation 
predicted the amount of attitude change.   
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Although this section has dealt with the underlying mechanisms theorized to be 
responsible for the confirmation bias, the behavioural consequences have only been 
discussed in passing.  Selective exposure, biased assimilation, a disconfirmation bias, 
attitude polarization and selective recall have all been linked to these processes.   In the 
following sections, each of these behavioural effects will be elaborated upon.   
 
Selective Exposure.    The information age has drastically changed the way we 
get our information.  On the one hand, it makes passive viewing of information (e.g. 
watching T.V.) less common and makes active exposure to information much easier.  At 
any given moment, an individual can select from virtually limitless amounts of 
information, finding support for any hypothesis.  Although some have hypothesized that 
an increase in open information will encourage political discussion and raise awareness 
of certain issues (Shah, Cho, Eveland & Kwak, 2005), others suggest that it will lead to 
increased polarization of attitudes and the fragmentation of society (Sunstein, 2007; 
Evans, Bryson, & DiMaggio, 2001; Jun, 2012).   
This latter hypothesis stems from work on selective exposure.  Selective exposure 
refers to the tendency for individuals to favour information that is congruent with one’s 
attitudes and preferentially avoid dissonant information.   This behaviour of seeking 
agreeable ideas is theorized to be a product of cognitive dissonance (Cotton, 1985; Olson 
& Stone, 2005; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt,& Frey, 2005; Mills, 1965).  Under this view, people 
seek out consonant ideas in order to avoid challenging ideas that would create a dissonant 
state.  The anticipation of incongruent evidence and thus cognitive dissonance motivates 
individuals to seek congruent information in an attempt to avoid dissonance.  
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Additionally, work by Brannon, Tagler & Eagly (2007) provided a series of 
studies revealing that attitude strength moderated selective exposure, with stronger 
attitudes providing a more extreme effect, presumably due to an increased motivation to 
prevent  dissonance.  The authors note that these results seem to conflict with those of 
Albarracin and Mitchell (2004) who showed that individuals who had high confidence 
and could successfully defend their attitudes were more likely to view counter-attitudinal 
information. However, Brannon and colleagues (2007) argue that while attitude strength 
and attitude confidence should correlate, no work has been done on this topic.  Instead, it 
may be that there exists an important psychological difference between attitude strength 
and attitude confidence, such that individuals with strong attitude confidence do not fear 
oppositional information.       
Work examining the effect of implicit and conscious attitudes has shown that they 
both predict selective exposure (Galdi, Gawronski, Arcuri & Friese, 2012).  However, 
whereas selective exposure has been correlated with explicit attitude strength, Galdi and 
colleagues (2012) found that the strength of automatic associations predicted selective 
exposure for those with weaker attitudes.  
Researchers have also argued for the importance of accuracy motives, citing the 
importance of the outcome and the utility of the available information as moderating 
factors (Tetlock, 1992; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Jonas, Greenberg, & Frey, 
2003).  For example, in a study by Jonas and Frey (2003), when participants were asked 
to take on the role of an advisor in helping another person make travel decisions they 
were more likely to be balanced when searching for information. Furthermore, additional 
analyses revealed that accuracy motivation partially mediated this effect.   
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Overall, arecent meta-analysis (Hart et al., 2009) revealed a preference for 
congruent versus incongruent information across studies.  As expected, selective 
exposure for congenial information was moderated by strength of attitude, the quality of 
the information, and the importance of the information.  
 
Biased Assimilation.   Research in social cognition has provided many examples 
in which prior information plays an important and powerful role in decision making (e.g. 
anchoring effects, Tversky & Khaneman, 1974).  Our ability to ‘know’ what things we 
will enjoy or agree with and what things we will dislike or disagree with is partially 
shaped by a behavioural tendency known as biased assimilation.  This bias posits that 
individuals will interpret information in a way, such that it remains consistent with prior 
beliefs, attitudes and expectations.    
While the Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) study depicted in the previous section 
provides one instance of this effect, it has been replicated in numerous other studies (e.g. 
Munro & Ditto, 1997; Miller, McHoskey, Bane & Dowd, 1993; Edwards & Smith, 
1996).  For example, in one study by Taber & Lodge (2006), which serves as part of the 
methodological basis for this project, subjects were asked to take part in a survey of 
public opinion.  Their task was to evaluate two contemporary political issues; gun control 
and affirmative action.   Participants were presented with a matrix of 16 hidden policy 
arguments via computer, which participants could view by clicking on them using a 
mouse.  However, the arguments were labeled with the argument’s position (political 
organizations that were in favour or against the issue).   They were then allowed to view 
8 of the 16 arguments with no time limit, but could not view the same argument twice.   
Participants who favoured gun control or affirmative action rated congruent arguments to 
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their own opinions as stronger than incongruent arguments, while those opposed to gun 
control and affirmative action saw the arguments against the issue as stronger.  The 
researchers also found effects for selective exposure, attitude polarization, biased 
assimilation, confirmation bias, and a disconfirmation bias.   
Although a cognitive view hypothesizes biased information-processing due to 
over-generalizations and adaptive heuristics (Koehler, 1991; Lord & Taylor, 2009), the 
motivational perspective argues that information that contradicts a pre-existing attitude 
produces negative arousal and subsequently produces motivation to reduce that 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Berkowitz & Devine, 1989) and indeed subsequent studies 
have documented the role of negative arousal in the effect (Munro & Ditto, 1997; Munro, 
Stansbury,& Tsai, 2012).   For example, Munro, Stansbury, and Tsai (2012), showed that 
by giving participants the opportunity to misattribute the negative affect felt when given 
attitude-incongruent scientific studies to ‘non-optimal’ room conditions  or water that 
contained ‘caffeine’ (Zanna & Cooper, 1974), it resulted in more positive ratings of the 
studies.     
 
Disconfirmation Bias.   Linked with biased assimilation, is a behavioural 
tendency to spend time and cognitive resources actively counterarguing attitudinally 
inconsistent information.  For example, the participants in Lord, Ross, and Lepper’s 
(1979) study were also asked to provide comments on their thoughts towards the 
congruent and incongruent studies.  One participant who was pro-capital punishment 
addressing an anti-capital punishment study reported “there were too many flaws in the 
picking of the states and too many variables involved in the experiment as a whole” 
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(p.2103); an anti-capital punishment person commenting on the same article stated “the 
murder rates climbed in all but two of the states after new laws were passed and no strong 
evidence to contradict the researchers was presented” (p. 2103). 
 Work by Edwards and Smith (1996) evaluated the disconfirmation bias in more 
detail, suggesting that when an argument is incongruent with prior beliefs, individuals 
will scrutinize the argument.  This scrutinizing requires extensive cognitive processing, 
drawing from memory evidence against the argument as well as further attention to the 
logic and evidence of the argument itself.   Additionally, the authors suggest that this 
scrutinization should be time consuming and result in more recalled material. Indeed, in a 
series of studies, the authors demonstrated that incongruent arguments resulted in longer 
processing and resulted in more arguments generated. 
 
Selective Recall.    Whether people are more likely to remember consistent or 
inconsistent information is still in contention (Strangor & McMillan, 1992; Eagly, Chen, 
Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes, 1999).  On the one hand, consistent information fits into an 
individual’s schema and is therefore more likely to be integrated and more likely to be 
recalled (Oswald & Grosjean, 2004).  On the other hand, inconsistent information results 
in an expectancy violation which is immediately salient and results in increased 
elaboration if viewed as a threat on the self, as discussed above. A meta-analysis (Eagly, 
Chen, Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes, 1999) examining this process found evidence for both, 
and although memory was slightly improved for congenial information, the studies were 
quite mixed in their conclusions. Further analysis revealed a number of moderating 
variables.  For example, higher attitude relevance correlated with a larger congeniality 
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effect, whereas higher outcome relevance was associated with a weaker effect.   
Additionally, more attitude-consistent information was remembered when it was delayed, 
than when tested immediately following exposure.  Thus, while the overall effect of 
attitude on memory is towards attitude-consistent information, this behavioural effect is 
more varied and nuanced then the ones mentioned in the previous sections.  
 
Attitude Polarization.   A consequence of the above behaviours, particularly that 
of biased assimilation, is the widening of attitudes among members (e.g. Lord, Ross & 
Lepper, 1979), However, attitude polarization findings are not without their criticisms.  
Miller and colleagues (1993) argued that only measures that ask participants if their 
attitude has changed show an effect whereas those measured with a pre-post design will 
not.  In their study, they conducted four conceptual replications of Lord and colleagues’ 
(1979) work (two on capital punishment and two on affirmative action).  While they 
consistently replicated the biased assimilation effect and perceived attitude change,   no 
polarization effects for a pre-post design were found.   Another issue may stem from the 
ambiguity surrounding the construct of attitude, for both researchers and participants 
alike (Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995).  Pomerantz and colleagues (1995) also 
argue that knowledge, personal importance, ego-involvement, extremity and certainty can 
also play a part in attitude polarization, with higher levels of the above factors leading to 
greater polarization. They go on to show that these factors load on to two separate 
dimensions; embeddedness which includes knowledge, personal importance and ego-
involvement and commitment which involved attitude extremity and certainty, with only 
the latter significantly affecting attitude polarization.  However, this work is at odds with 
17 
 
 
 
work by Taber and Lodge (2006) who argue for a ‘sophistication effect,’ such that more 
knowledgeable people will show greater polarization because they are better able to 
counter argue incongruent information.    
 
Individual Differences and the Confirmation Bias.  Despite extensive work 
examining both the mechanisms and behaviours surrounding the confirmation bias, little 
work has been done examining individual differences (Rassin, 2008), prompting Rassin 
to create his own personality measure to specifically examine differences, however this 
research is mainly descriptive with little theoretical insight.  Other variables have looked 
at the behaviours discussed above that relate to  the confirmation bias. One variable that 
has been looked at with respect to selective exposure is ‘closed-mindedness’ using 
Rokeach’s (1960) dogmatism scale, Byrne’s (1964) Repression-Sensitization Scale or the 
Right Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1996; as cited by Hart, el al., 2009).  
Indeed, Hart et al. (2009) show that selective exposure is higher for individuals scoring 
high on closed-mindedness scales than those scoring low on these scales.   
 Another variable that plays a role is self-esteem.  The need for self-esteem 
strongly influences an individual’s cognition and behaviour (Allport, 1961; Pyszcynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004) and has been shown to be an important 
mediator of biased behaviour (Pyszcynski & Greenberg, 1987; Tesser, 2000 ).   The self-
serving attribution bias can be seen as a type of confirmation bias, with individuals 
attributing their successes to themselves but attributing external factors as responsible for 
their failures (Miller & Ross, 1975; Pyszcynski & Greenberg, 1987; Blain & Crocker, 
1993).  Research has also shown that variations in self-esteem can affect how individuals 
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react to information with individuals with high self-esteem better able to rationalize 
threatening information, presumably because individuals with high self-esteem draw 
upon a larger pool of positive experiences and, as such, are less likely to be threatened by 
the information  (Nail, Misak, & Davis, 2004; Steele, Spencer,& Lynch, 1993).  Indeed, 
the self-affirmation literature supports this idea (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000).  
 Lastly, although the confirmation biasis not associated with intelligence and 
cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 2008), individuals with greater cognitive ability 
have a greater ‘bias blind spot’, in that the more intelligent an individual, the more likely 
they were to attribute a confirmation bias to others as opposed to themselves (West, 
Meserve,& Stanovich, 2012). The researchers argue that this difference may be due to 
intelligent people expecting to outperform others on cognitive tasks and the idea that they 
hold their cognitive ability as an important aspect of themselves.   
 
The Confirmation Bias and Uncertainty.   A necessary requirement for the 
confirmation bias is uncertainty and the major cause of this uncertainty is conflicting 
information. By definition, individuals will be unable to show bias in assimilating, 
selectively recall or selectively expose themselves to information when all the 
information is congruent.  Current models of the confirmation bias suggest that uncertain 
information is motivating, and as such individuals have a need to gather information and 
reduce the uncertainty (Trope & Liberman, 1996).  For example one study had 
participants evaluate the performance of two boys.  Participants were told that they were 
either from a high or low socioeconomic status background to manipulate consistent or 
inconsistent information.    Participants who were given inconsistent information paid 
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more attention to the boy and gave more complex evaluations (Hilton, Klein, & von 
Hippel, 1991).  Additionally, Trope and Ben-Yair (1982) showed that if participants were 
given ‘uncertain’ feedback following their ‘initial task’ that measured their mental 
abilities, they were more motivated to work on that task than on a task in which they were 
given more certain and diagnostic feedback.   However, Sorrentino and colleagues 
(Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; Sorrentino et al., 1988; Hodson & Sorrentino, 1997) have 
proposed that uncertainty is not motivating for everyone.  Rather, individuals differ 
drastically in how they approach and react to uncertainty. 
Uncertainty Orientation 
"Uncertainty is a fact with which all forms of life must be prepared to  
contend. At all levels of biological complexity there is uncertainty about  
the significance of signs or stimuli and about the possible consequences of  
actions" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, p. 144). 
 
Although uncertainty plays a pervasive role in our lives, uncertainty reduction has 
been theorized as an innate biological requirement (Kalma, 1986; Inglis, 2000).  Indeed 
individuals have a need to understand, predict and control their environment (Bandura, 
1997).  However, the theory of uncertainty orientation (Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; 
Sorrentino, Short, & Raynor, 1984) suggests that this may not be true for all people.    
Although individualshave an innate tendency to reduce uncertainty, the theory of 
uncertainty orientation positsdifferent ways in which individuals react to and 
handleuncertainty.  It distinguishes between people who are uncertainty-oriented (UOs) 
and those who are certainty-oriented (COs).  Those who are oriented towards uncertainty 
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actively try to understand the causes of their uncertainty and confront uncertainty with 
the intention of resolving it, whereas those who are oriented toward certainty attempt to 
maintain certainty, gravitating towards predictable environments and preferring non-
diagnostic information to diagnostic information (Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; Sorrentino, 
Short & Raynor, 1984; Sorrentino et al., 1988).    Whereas, COs maintain what is already 
known about the self and their environment, UOs explore the potential implications of 
uncertainty.  However, UOs only engage in active, systematic information processing and 
decrease their passive, heuristic information processing when they encounter uncertain 
situations that are important and self-relevant.  In situations that have little importance, 
UOs are not motivated to seek out new information and thus engage in passive 
information processing.  COs exhibit the opposite pattern.   In situations that are not 
personally relevant and devoid of uncertainty, COs will engage in greater information 
processing than in uncertain situations because rather than being motivated by 
uncertainty like UOs; COs gravitate and are motivated by certain and predictable 
environments.  This pattern reverses for non-personally relevant situations whereby UOs 
will use more heuristic processing and COs will use less. (Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; 
Sorrentino et al., 1988).  Sorrentino and Short (1986) summarize uncertainty orientation 
as,  “a cognitive individual difference variable related to information value.  It serves as a 
situational screening device that, when identifying relevant situations, arouses the 
appropriate source of motivation” (p.393).  
It should be noted that although the theory of uncertainty orientation is similar to 
Rokeach’s (1960) theory that suggests open and closed-mindedness as a stable 
intelligence-related dimension, uncertainty orientation suggests that there are situations 
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when UOs may appear smarter and/or perform better on a specific task than COs, 
however there are situations in which COs will outperform UOs.  As mentioned, UOs 
will be more motivated in uncertain situations involving uncertainty, whereas COs will 
be more motivated in situations that are more predictable.   Thus, it is the match between 
the person’s orientation and the specific situation that will determine how individuals 
process information and behave 
Uncertainty orientation, like the confirmation bias, reflects an interplay between 
cognition and motivation, that is situated in uncertainty and as such is suggested to be an 
important individual difference variable. 
Uncertainty Orientation and Information Processing. Although incongruent 
information may be very effective in learning something new, it also creates a sense of 
uncertainty where individuals must engage in effortful processing to make sense of the 
world.  However, COs prefer to maintain what they already know and tend to avoid 
inconsistent information and cognitively processing it (Shuper & Sorrentino, 2004; 
Hodson & Sorrentino, 2001).  One study by Roney and Sorrentino (1987) showed that 
COs have much more rigid, distinct, black and white categories.  While this may be 
advantageous in terms of cognitive efficiency, it may be difficult for COs to reconcile 
views between overlapping categories.  In another study, Sorrentino et al. (1988, study 1), 
participants were told that the University was considering comprehensive exams.   
Participants were told that the University was planning on implementing these exams 
either in 1-2 years or 5-10 years in order to manipulate personal relevance and then were 
given either one-sided or two-sided arguments for the plan.  The research showed that 
UOs, consistent with previous research (Petty and Caciopo, 1981; Lumsdaine and Janis, 
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1953), exhibited greater persuasion when presented with a two-sided message than when 
presented with a one-sided message under a high personal relevance condition.  
Ostensibly, UOs faced with the uncertainty expended cognitive effort in order to resolve 
the inconsistency and in doing so were more persuaded by the incongruent two-sided 
message. However, COs behaved oppositely and were less persuaded by the two-sided 
message than the one-sided message under high personal relevance.   
Furthermore, Sorrentino and colleagues  (1988, study 2) found differences 
between COs and UOs in the effect of personal relevance and argument type on attitude 
change.  The researchers here demonstrated that UOs showed greater attitude change 
when personal relevance was high and when argument strength was strong.  This was 
expected, as one tends to focus more on arguments that are personally relevant.  
However, the opposite occurred for COs; the degree of persuasion actually decreased for 
arguments with high personal relevance compared to low personal relevance.   Similarly, 
Sorrentino et. al., (1988, study 2) found that when reading expert versus non-expert 
advice, COs reacted opposite to UOs.  COs had the greatest difference between high and 
low expert conditions when the issue was highly relevant, indicating that they were 
affected by the heuristic of an‘expert’ and not the message itself, whereas UOs were only 
affected by the source in low personally relevant situations.   The first experiment 
demonstrates that since certainty and predictability are preferred by COs, they don't 
scrutinize arguments that prove inconsistent, but rather use heuristics in an attempt to 
maintain certainty.   The second experiment seemingly showed that under high personal 
relevance COs are not motivated to think for themselves and tend to focus on heuristics, 
in this case, expert advice.  UOs on the other hand, were more motivated by the personal 
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relevance and focused more on the strength of argument.  It is important to not, that when 
the issue was not personally relevant, COs do seem to think for themselves, demonstrated 
by COs focusing more on strength of the argument when personal relevance was low.   
A study by Driscoll, Hamilton and Sorrentino (1991) showed that UOs are more 
likely to attend to information that is not congruent with one’s world view, whereas COs 
were more likely to attend to congruent information, indicating a difference in cognitive 
processing.  In a study by Hodson and Sorrentino (2001), participants were given Tajfel 
matrices (see Tajfel et., al. 1971) to assess in-group bias.  It was found that under 
conditions of uncertainty, COs showed much more in-group bias, whereas there was no 
difference between conditions for UOs.  The effect was presumably due to the 
understanding that in conditions of uncertainty, COs focus on heuristics, in this case, “to 
look after one’s own.”   Moreover, a study by Shuper and Sorrentino (2004) showed that 
UOs scrutinize messages when there is an imbalance between the message and the source 
(e.g. minority/majority), whereas COs were more likely to scrutinize the message when 
there was consistency between the source and the message, demonstrating differences in 
systematic processing between UOs and COs in consistent and inconsistent situations.  It 
is important to note, then, that the differences in uncertainty orientation are not due to 
differences in cognitive ability or capacity, but rather a function of one’s motivational 
inclination towards uncertainty.  Taken together these four studies show that COs 
decrease use of systematic processing when faced with uncertainty/inconsistency, 
especially under high personal relevance, whereas UOs increase their cognitive 
processing under these conditions (Sorrentino et al., 1988; Hodson & Sorrentino, 2001).  
Furthermore, UOs are more likely to attend and scrutinize incongruent information than 
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are COs (Driscoll et al., 1991; Hodson & Sorrentino, 2003).   
Embodied Cognition 
The past three decades have seen the advancement of embodiment research in 
social psychology.   This phenomenon suggests that social information processing does 
not just create bodily states and behaviour, but rather involves and is influenced by them.  
Indeed this view is compatible with many of social psychology’s core assumptions, 
namely that our thoughts, feelings, and behaviours are influenced by others and 
situations.   
Disembodied views of cognition suggest that knowledge is exclusively part of the 
semantic memory system and does not involve perception, action or affect.  However, 
although a complete conception of embodied cognition is not well defined (Gibbs, 2006; 
Neidenthal, Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2004; Wilson, 2002; Smith & Semin, 2004; Barsalou, 
2008a) it is agreed that bodily states, at least in some way, underlie cognition.   
Embodied theories depart from traditional theories of knowledge in that 
conventional theories suggest that knowledge is based on mental representations that 
reprocess sensory, motor or even introspective experiences (Barsalou, 1999).  For 
example, when a person sees a puppy, one has a sensory experience.  They will have a 
visual experience from seeing it, a tactile experience from petting it, and an auditory 
experience and olfactory experience from hearing and smelling it.  They will also have a 
motor experience from moving their hands along its head and back and have an 
introspective experience, perhaps happiness or fear.   The conventional view would 
suggest a symbolic system converts these states producing a description of the event in a 
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separate system of amodal (referring to the absence of a specific modal area of processing 
e.g. the sensorimotor system) in preference of a conceptual schematic network.  An 
embodied view hypothesizes that these initial experiences can be mappedthrough a 
representation of language but remain situated in the body.  Furthermore, the 
conventional cognitive view suggests that processing of an event or word, does not 
involve processing through the sensory or motor areas of the brain but rather through 
recall within this symbolic memory system.  The embodied view, however, suggests that 
instead of recalling an experience involving the activation of amodal representations, 
recall involves the original sensory, motor or introspective areas. Rather than simply 
recalling your dog experience through this amodal system, you will also recall it through 
the appropriate sensorimotor areas. In other words, when one reads a book, it does not 
simply create a symbolic representation, it induces a simulation of the 
experience.Although a lot of the research that will be explored in this paper suggests the 
need of actual bodily states, this is not required.  A simulation of the bodily state in the 
motor area may be enough.  As research has demonstrated (Baraslou, 1999; Wells & 
Petty, 1980; Duclos et al., 1989), embodiment may range from simulation to full 
execution.    
In 1980, Wells and Petty showed that nodding one’s head up and down in 
agreement while listening to a persuasive message resulted in a greater positive attitude 
to the message than individuals who shook their head left and right in disagreement.  
Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) showed that those who were told to smile found 
cartoons significantly funnier than those who had their smiles inhibited (by gripping a 
pen in their mouth). A study by Duclos et al. (1989) found that people who took angry, 
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fearful, or sad body positions would experience an increase in those moods respectively.  
Furthermore, a study by Cacioppo, Priester and Berntston (1993) showed that Chinese 
symbols were rated more positively during arm flexion than during arm extension, 
presumably because arm flexion is related to approach, whereas arm extension is related 
to avoidance.   
 The above studies represent what is known as online embodiment; that bodily 
responses facilitate cognitive processing (Wilson, 2002; Neidenthal, Baraslou, Ric, & 
Krauth-Gruber, 2005).   This process is differentiated from offline embodied cognition; 
the idea that embodied simulations will occur in conjunction with semantic mental 
representations. ,.  In other words, just by thinking about an object can produce an 
embodied state.  In one study by Chen and Bargh, (1999), participants were given 
positively and negatively valenced words such as love or hate.  Participants were then 
asked to either pull a lever toward themselves or push it away when a word was 
presented.  Participants responded more quickly when the behaviour and the valence 
matched (pulling and positive or pushing and negative).  Similarly, a study by Bargh, 
Chen and Burrows (1996) showed that when participants were given words that fit to an 
elderly stereotype, for example ‘grey’ or ‘Florida’, they took longer to walk down the hall 
to the elevator than did control participants.  These studies demonstrate that a physical 
response can be engaged when individuals process information offline.  Some 
embodiment researchers cite this as evidence that suggests that just thinking about 
something involves activity in motor areas (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2004; 
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  Neidenthal and colleagues (2004) 
argued that the mirror neuron system, which corresponds to both observed and performed 
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behaviours could be, at least in part, responsible for embodied cognition.  However, there 
is still disagreement on exactly how mirror neurons function (Gallese, Kevsers, Rizzolati, 
2004) and how they would function in relation to embodied cognition is still not 
understood. 
 Neuroscience research has substantiated these ideas as well.  Work by Damasio, 
Tranel and Damasio (1993) has shown that priming verbs activate the same areas 
associated with   motor movements, whereas priming colours activate the visual 
processing cortex.  Similarly, work has shown that being primed with manipulable 
objects, for example, a hammer, activated the same neural areas associated with grasping 
(Chao & Martin, 2000). 
These above findings, among others, have helped build on the idea that the mind 
is fundamentally embodied.  The embodiment hypothesis suggests that cognition is 
intertwined in the body’s interactions with the world (Wilson, 2002) and as such not only 
influences but may also involve our perceptions and actions.  Thelen, Schoner, Scheir, & 
Smith (2001) wrote in regards to embodied cognition: 
“To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily 
interactions with the world. From this point of view, cognition depends on 
the kinds of experiences that come from having a body with particular 
perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and that 
together form the matrix within which memory, emotion, language, and all 
other aspects of life are meshed. The contemporary notion of embodied 
cognition stands in contrast to the prevailing cognitivist stance which sees 
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the mind as a device to manipulate symbols and is thus concerned with the 
formal rules and processes by which the symbols appropriately represent 
the world (p. 5).”  
According to Thelen and colleagues (2001) then, our bodies and environment do 
not simply interact with cognition, they play a necessary role in shaping and 
developing our cognitive capacities.    
Embodiment and Conceptual Metaphor. 
“When we describe the workings of emotion, ideas, or trends of character, 
we almost invariably use terms that also denote properties and processes 
observable in the world of nature. Terms such as warm, hard, straight refer 
to properties of things and of persons. We say that a man thinks straight; 
that he faces a hard decision; that his feelings have cooled. We call 
persons deep and shallow, bright and full, colorful and colorless, rigid and 
elastic. Indeed, for the description of persons we draw upon the entire 
range of sensory modalities . . . the language of social experience and 
action reveals the same characteristic. We are joined to people with ties 
and bonds; classes are high and low; groups exert pressure, maintain 
distance from other groups, and possess atmosphere.” (Asch, 1958, p. 86 - 
87) 
It has been suggested that language itself is grounded in human action (Glenberg, 
1997; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Newton, 1996; Johnson & Lakoff, 2002).   In this 
view, the meaning of the word corresponds to the action.  For example, the description, 
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“it has a handle on the top” affects how we are prepared to deal with it.   In a study by 
Glenberg and Kaschak, (2002), participants were given sentences like “open the drawer” 
or “open the plate.”   The researchers assumed that one has to pull an object towards 
oneself in order to open it (i.e. open a drawer) and as such could not open a plate.  They 
were also given a response box with 3 buttons in a column (far, close, and middle).  The 
experimenters asked participants if the sentences made sense.  Participants had to begin 
with their hand on the middle button and then move to the correct answer when shown 
the word.  Participants were faster answering when the yes button was the far button (i.e. 
Yes-far, No-close) when given sentences like “open the plate” but were faster when yes 
was the close button (i.e. Yes-close, No-far) for sentences like “open the drawer” 
ostensibly because in order to understand the sentence one first had to mentally embody 
that action by pulling the plate/drawer inwards to ‘open it.’  
Furthermore, current research has supported the idea that since language is 
embodied then our bodily states are also intertwined with abstract thoughts and metaphor 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau, Meier, & Keefe, 2010).  For example, the use of 
cleanliness to refer to morality is evident through everyday common language “feeling 
dirty,”  “wiping your hands clean” or “clean slate.”  A series of studies have shown that 
our sense of morality is grounded in a physical sense of cleanliness (Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006; Lee & Schwarz, 2010).   In these studies, it has been shown that post-
decisional dissonance of moral transgressions can be appeased by the act of cleaning and 
that those who do commit wrongdoings find cleaning products (either mouthwash, if 
done orally or hand sanitizer, if done by writing) more alluring.  Furthermore, those who 
have cleaned themselves feel more self-righteous and are more likely to make harsher 
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judgments of wrong behaviour. 
 Cleanliness has been shown to go beyond morality.  A study by Xu, Zwick, and 
Schwarz (2011) showed that by cleaning oneself, a participant’s perception of the 
influence of badluck could be ‘washed away.’  Furthermore, Lee and Schwarz (2010b) 
showed that the act of washing one’s hands can reduce other post-decisional dissonance 
effects. In their study, participants were asked to pick between Musical Compact Discs 
(CDs) or jams.  Those participants who examined a soap bottle exhibited the typical 
effect of justifying their choice, either by rating the CD as better or the jam as better 
tasting.   Those whoactually washed their hands did not exhibit this effect.    Thus the 
expression ‘a clean slate’ appears to be not only not an expression, it extends into 
cognition as well. 
 The past decade has seen an explosion of research examining the ways in which 
metaphor can be used to shape cognition.  Vertical position has been related to 
perceptions of power as well as attractiveness (Schubert, 2005; Meier & Dionne, 2009), 
increased spatial distance was shown to decrease emotional attachment (Williams & 
Bargh, 2008b) and physical warmth has led to increased feeling of perceived friendliness 
and emotional attachment (Williams & Bargh, 2008a; Ijzerman & Semin, 2009), to list 
just a few examples. 
 Weight, as a metaphor, has importance in many languages including English, 
Dutch, Spanish and Chinese (Jostmann, Lakens&Schubert, 2009).   People ‘weigh their 
decisions’ they ‘weigh their options’ and importance ‘carries weight.’   In a study by 
Jostmann, Lakens and Schubert (2009), the investigators show that the relationship 
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between weight and importance is not only linguistic and metaphorical but also important 
for cognition.  They found that those holding a heavier clipboard increased the 
importance of fair decision-making procedures.  In addition, it caused more elaborate 
thinking, which was evident by a higher consistency between related judgments.  
Furthermore there was an increase in the polarization of the participants’ ratings for 
strong versus weak arguments.  
 In another study by Lee and Schwarz (June 2
nd
, 2011 personal communication; 
Lee & Schwarz, 2012) the expression ‘on one hand and on the other’, describing a 
balance of evidence, was coupled with the embodiment of moving hands, palms up 
alternatively up and down.  When participants were asked to move their hands in this 
way, they showed an increase in the importance to ‘balance in life’, an increase in 
balance of work and leisure when making schedules and more balance of price and 
quality in a production task. 
Embodiment Mechanisms. The processes behind embodiment are not well 
established.  Despite all the evidence, no major theory has emerged to explain it (Smith & 
Semin, 2004; Neidenthal et al., 2005), although a few hypotheses have been ventured 
(Barsalou, 1999; Neidenthal et al., 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). As discussed, the 
primary view is that cognitive representations are situated in the brain’s sensorimotor 
system and through our experience in the world we develop mental representations of 
these abstract concepts that can then be activated to influence our thoughts (Neidenthal 
et. al, 2005; Barsalou, 2008b).  In this model, cognition works similarly to current models 
of amodal and symbolic mental representation which is the basis for most models of 
semantic priming and goal priming. However, because behaviouris based in the 
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perceptual and sensorimotor system, associations can be activated by stimulating those 
specific areas and not only by activating symbolic connections.  
Metaphor has a strong link to linguistics and, because of the link between 
cognition and linguistics, metaphor has been conceptualized as a way to understand 
abstract concepts using more concrete concepts (Gibbs, 2006).   Although these concepts 
may be superficially dissimilar (e.g. warmth and friendliness), they influence our 
cognition and shape our thoughts and behaviour. Although some have argued whether 
metaphors are simply a linguistic tool, the research reviewed above provides empirical 
evidence that metaphors influence processing in ways that would not be predicted from a 
schematic model (Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010).  However, it should be noted that this 
metaphor perspective does not replace the schematic perspective;indeed, dealing with 
social concepts, people use schematic information.  Rather, the metaphor perspective 
enriches this view by suggesting that people, in addition, access bodily representations, 
and provides an avenue for exploring other empirical findings that would not be possible 
without this perspective.   
Understanding the effects of embodied metaphor requires drawing a distinction 
between the effects of conceptual metaphor and embodied cognition. Recall the puppy 
example, whereby our concept of the puppy is shaped by sensorimotor and 
proprioceptive representations.  In the same way, our understanding of a mouse or of a 
bowling ball or any other object includes specific representations.  These representations 
are directly tied to our understanding of the object. While many objects may be smooth, 
the specific ‘smooth’ representation of a bowling ball or of a mouse is inherently linked 
to that object and derived from previous experiences with that category. Work that 
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examines the effect of an embodied representation, such as smiling or nodding (e.g. 
Strack, Martin & Stepper, 1988; Wells & Petty, 1980) would be examples of this.  
Another example comes from work by Neidenthal, Wiekileman, Mondillon and 
Vermulean (2009) who showed that when people had to make judgments about whether 
they enjoyed or were disgusted by certain concepts (viewed as words, e.g. sun, cuddle, or 
murder) they also exhibited activity association with their facial muscles (e.g. the 
zygomaticus major muscle associated with smiling).  This suggests that these muscles are 
activated in association with specific stimuli, but do not provide evidence for the link 
between metaphor and behaviour (Landau, Keefer, & Meier, 2010)     
On the other hand, conceptual metaphor theory postulates that representations do 
not have to be directly linked to their concept.  Consider the work by Williams and Bargh 
(2008a) who showed that people’s perceptions of friendliness and emotional closeness of 
another individual are increased when holding a warm cup.  Indeed, while we may have 
learned early in our life about the association of warmth and closeness while being 
cradled in our mother’s arm, we can think about the temperature outside and what we 
should wear, without any metaphorical linking.    However, this distinction is not meant 
to suggest that the processes are mutually exclusive.  Rather, it is suggested that through 
scaffolding on early experiences, we develop the basis for these conceptual metaphors.   
Work examining embodied metaphor from a social neuroscience perspective has 
also provided evidence of the link between metaphor, cognition and behaviour.  One 
study showed that the regions that are associated with physical warmth were also 
activated in violations to a trust game (Kang, Williams, Clark, & Bargh, 2010).   
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Individual Differences.  Current conceptualizations of embodied cognition argue 
that embodiment manipulations work similar to priming of goals.  Recent priming 
research has suggested that priming may induce goal activation (Forster, Liberman, & 
Friedman, 2007), and that these goal states can interact with one’s motivation (Cesario, 
Plaks, & Higgins, 2006; Hart & Albarracin, 2009).  For example, Cesario and colleagues 
(2006) found, when replicating the Bargh (1996) elderly stereotype prime (experiment 2), 
participants with positive attitudes towards elderly individuals walked more slowly, 
whereas those with negative attitudes walked more quickly.  Similarly, Harts & 
Albarracin (2009),showed that priming achievement only facilitated motivation to 
achieve a goal with individuals with high achievement motivation, whereas it inhibited 
the goal in individuals with low achievement motivation. Similarly, priming achievement 
in those with low achievement motivation instilled goals of fun and leisure, whereas it 
inhibited these goal in those with high achievement.  Dijksterhuis and Aarts (2010) have 
argued that rather than motivation being a conscious mental representation to achieve 
some volitional behaviour, which has traditionally assumed to be the case, recent research 
(e.g. Soon, Brass, Heinz, & Haynes, 2008; Bargh et al., 2001; Aarts et al., 2008) suggests 
that people are only consciously aware of their motivation after they have unconsciously 
had it activated.  
In addition, work from Sherman and Clore (2009) showed that processing speed 
was facilitated when immorality words (e.g. cheat or hate) were paired with black and 
morality words (e.g. helping or honesty) were paired with white.  However, faster 
associations were found among participants who had higher desirability for cleaning 
products and among those who had been primed with immorality, suggesting that one’s 
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motivation of cleanliness moderated the priming task.  Work from the embodiment 
literature has also contributed to this idea.  For example, depressed individuals typically 
prefer areas that are lower with respect to vertical space (Meier & Robinson, 2006), or 
those who have a stronger power motive are quicker to react to primes with higher spatial 
locations (Moeller, Robinsons, Ode,& Zabelina, 2008).   The study by Moeller and 
colleagues , (2008) showed that individuals who had a need for power and dominance 
were quicker at responding to a cue at the top of a screen than at the bottom of the screen, 
than those that did not have as strong a motivation for dominance. The researchers argued 
that one’s motivation for power carried over into the vertical sensory domain, which has 
been demonstrated to correlate with power.  In addition, work by Schubert and colleagues 
has shown that making a fist leads male, but not female participants to see themselves as 
more assertive (Schubert & Koole, 2009; Schubert, 2004).   
Despite the extensive research into embodiment over the past decade, only a few 
studies have examined individual differences (Meier, Schnall, Schwaz, Bargh, in press).  
Although personality theorists have long contended that an individual’s thoughts and 
behaviours will predictably vary, little research has integrated individual differences in 
embodiment theory.  The motivational and cognitive overlap between the confirmation 
bias and uncertainty orientation allows for exploration on individual differences and 
embodied cognition 
The Present Study 
Uncertainty orientation, like the confirmation bias, is an interplay of motivation, 
cognition, and uncertainty.  As such, it appears to be a potential moderator of the 
confirmation bias.  As discussed, uncertainty orientation theory suggests that people will 
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differ in the degree in which they are actively engaged by uncertainty.  Thus UOs and 
COs should differ in how they react to new information and how much they orient to 
what they believe or already know.   With respect to the confirmation bias, UOs should 
be more willing to confront uncertainty in search for ‘truth,’ be actively engaged by 
uncertain situations and engage in more systematic processing in these situations. In this 
way, UOs should be guided by accuracy goals as depicted by theories of motivated 
hypothesis testing (Kunda, 1990; Trope & Liberman, 1996). Therefore UOs should be 
less likely to seek out only congruent information and less biased assimilation. Previous 
research has shown that UOs are more likely to seek out threatening and efficacious 
information (Brouwers & Sorrentino, 1993) and engage in more systematic processing 
when confronting incongruent arguments (Sorrentino et al., 1988; Shuper & Sorrentino, 
2004).  COs, on the other hand, will be more likely to seek out certain and predictable 
situations and will be less engaged by uncertain situations, typically circumventing 
uncertainty, either by choosing environments that limit uncertainty (Sorrentino & Hewitt, 
1984; Sorrentino et al., 1992) or by using heuristics (Sorrentino et al, 1988).  As such, 
they should be guided by directional goals, seeking congruent information and be biased 
in processing information.   
In addition to the effect of uncertainty orientation on the confirmation bias, this 
study will be exploring the embodied metaphor of ‘weighing both sides’ to create 
balance.  While one might expect embodying this concept to produce a more balanced 
search and processing for all individuals, recent theorizing into embodied metaphor 
suggests that metaphors highlight one’s inherent motivation.  
Although it is expected that UOs will be more likely than COs to seek out and 
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interpret incongruent information in a balanced way, an interaction should be seen 
whereby the embodiment manipulation should intensify UOs need to confront and 
resolve uncertainty, resulting in less biased information search and assimilation of the 
information.  Conversely, because COs do not have this need to resolve uncertainty, they 
should not be affected by the manipulation and as such not differ from the control 
group.  Under this view, embodying this motion  activates the physical concept of 
balance, which in turn activates associations related to the metaphorical concept of 
balance, resulting in less biased information processing.  However, UOs who have the 
concept of balance more accessible in personally relevant situations should be affected by 
this manipulation more than COs. 
However, an alternative hypothesis is theorized in which the embodiment 
manipulation of balance metaphorically represents attributing weight to arguments.  
Work from Cesario, Plaks and Higgins, (2006) and Hart and Albarracin (2009) suggests 
an interplay between inherent motivations and primes. Other work from Moeller, 
Robinson and Zabelina, (2008) showed that those low in power motivation were actually 
slower in responses to cues at the top of the screen than to the control cues at the left and 
right position, suggesting that those with low motivation for power exhibited the reverse 
effects.  Similarly, although making a fist activates the concept of power for both men 
and woman, it increases the want for power for men but decreases it for women 
(Schubert, 2004). Thus, if providing weight increases personal relevance, this may in turn 
strengthen UOs need to resolve the uncertainty, but alternatively strengthen COs need to 
maintain certainty, thus resulting in greater bias for COs.  Thus, COs should may become 
even more unbalanced in the same way that those who disliked elderly people walked 
38 
 
 
 
faster.   
In addition to these hypotheses, exploratory research will also examine the effects 
of uncertainty orientation and embodied cognition on selective recall and attitude 
polarization.  These dependent variables were studied as they often are examined in 
conjunction with the biasing effect of attitudes on information processing.  More 
importantly, embodiment effects relating to attitude polarization and selective recall will 
demonstrate that embodiment affects encoding of information. Interactions regarding 
embodiment and uncertainty orientation with respect to attitude polarization suggest that 
participants are incorporating the information they read differently across conditions.  If 
participants exhibit less polarization, or a decrease in attitude strength, it would provide 
evidence that participants are not simply seeking information and rating arguments in a 
more balanced manner but internalizing the information. As such UOs may tend to 
depolarize more while in the embodiment condition, with COs either hyperpolarizing or 
showing no effect.  Additionally, if embodying balance increases systematic processing 
for UOs, UOs should then be more likely to elaborate and subsequently be more likely to 
recall information.  Similarly, if it increases heuristic style processing for COs; this 
should be reflected in less elaboration and worse memory for COs.  The general 
hypothesis of the present study, therefore, is that UOs will show more evidence of 
balanced reasoning in the embodiment condition than COs, and this difference will be 
greater than in the control condition. 
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Overview 
A general linear model design examining the interacting effects of embodiment 
and uncertainty orientation, resulting in a 2 (embodiment: hands ‘up’ versus hands down) 
x 2 (uncertainty-orientation: COs and UOs) was analyzed on the five dependent 
variables, namely selective exposure, biased assimilation, selective recall, attitude 
polarization, and the disconfirmation bias. 
Participants 
A total of 180 introductory psychology students from the University of Western 
Ontario were recruited through the Psychology participant pool.  Data from 6 participants 
were lost due to computer failure.  This resulted in a total of 174 participants (124 female 
and 50 male) aged 16 to 35, M = 18.68, (SD = 2.03).  Participants received 1.5 credits 
towards their introductory psychology class (Psychology 1000) for their participation in 
the study. 
Independent Variables 
 Uncertainty Orientation. In line with Atkinson’s work (Atkinson, 1964; 
Atkinson & Feather, 1966) that argues for both the approach and the avoidant measures 
of a personality dimension, uncertainty orientation is assessed by one’s desire to resolve 
uncertainty and one’s desire to maintain predictability (see Frederick and Sorrentino, 
1977 and Sorrentino et al., 1990 for reviews).  It is assumed that one’s desire to maintain 
clarity is independent from one’s motivation to resolve uncertainty.  As such, an 
individual may be high or low on both of these motives and thus a resultant measure, one 
that controls for both, is a better predictor than a single measure.   Therefore, uncertainty 
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orientation is the resultant measure of uncertainty, composed of individual measures of 
nUncertainty (uncertainty scores standardized) and nAuthoritarianism (authoritarianism 
scores standardized).  
Uncertainty is measured by a projective measure based on the Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT; Sorrentino, Hanna,& Roney, 1992) and is used to assess an 
individual’s desire to resolve uncertainty about the self and the environment. The TAT 
included 4 lead-in sentences such as “Two people are working in a laboratory on a piece 
of equipment” and then asked participants four questions to help lead their stories (See 
Appendix A). An expert scorer, who has achieved an inter-rater reliability of greater than 
0.90 on pre-approved materials, scored the TAT. 
The authoritarian component is measured using Cherry and Byrne’s (1977) 
acquiescence-free message of authoritarianism, which measures authoritarianism using a 
21-item measure on a 6-point scale, known as the F-scale (Appendix B). For example, 
one question asks “What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, 
and the will to work and fight for family and country.” 
Each participant’s Uncertainty and authoritarian scores are standardized into z-
scores and subsequently the authoritarian z-scores are subtracted from the Uncertainty z-
scores to give the resultant measure of uncertainty orientation (RUM) with those 
receiving higher scores considered to be more Uncertainty-Oriented and those receiving 
lower scores considered to be more Certainty-Oriented. 
Embodiment.  Since adding physical weight actually ‘gives weight’ to an idea or 
an object in that it makes it more important (Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009; 
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Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann, & Lakens, 2011), giving weight to two objects or ideas 
should make both ideas important, leading to a more balanced approach.   Adapted from 
Lee and Schwarz (2012), the balancing gesture that often accompanies weighing ideas or 
the expression ‘on the one hand and on the other’ was used as an embodiment 
manipulation to activate this metaphorical notion of balance.  This gesture has three 
features.  The first is that palms are open and facing upwards, the second is that arms 
move alternately up and down and the third is that hands are out to the side of the body.   
Because palms are faced upwards, this condition will be referred to as the ‘up’ condition.  
A control condition was also used, in this case with both palms facing down, and to the 
side, moving up and down
2
.  Likewise, this condition will be referred to as the ‘down’ 
condition. 
Attitudes.  Participants were able to choose between one of four important issues; 
abortion, capital punishment, employment equity, and same-sex marriage.  Specifically 
participants were asked “which of the following issues is most important to you.” 
Following this, participants were asked whether they were in favour of the issue they 
chose or opposed (abortion was listed as prochoice or prolife). In line with Taber and 
Lodge (2006), participants were then asked about their attitudes on a single attitudinal 
measure (measured from 1 – 100, with 1 = indifferent and 100 = extremely strong) and 
their perceived knowledge on the issue (measure 1 -5, with 5 being very knowledgeable, 
and 1 being not knowledgeable).   
                                                        
2
 Previous research using this manipulation also used a second control condition in which participants 
hands were held palm up, but did not move.  The researchers found no differences between both this 
condition and the ‘down’ condition (Lee & Schwarz, Personal Communication, June 2nd, 2011) 
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DemographicsQuestionnaire. Participants were given a series of demographic 
questions that pertained to their age, sex, and ethnicity (See Appendix C).  
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables were assessed in conjunction with  an information board 
derived from work conducted by Taber and Lodge (2006).  The information board 
consisted of 16 cells, in a 4 x 4 matrix (See Appendix D). Each of the cells were blank 
but participants could click on them to reveal an argument. Arguments were taken from 
various online political groups and from Taber and Lodge (2006).   Furthermore, each 
row was labeled with the name of a political group (e.g. Canadians In Favour of Same-
Sex Marriage) so that participants would know which arguments would be congruent 
with their attitudes and which arguments would be incongruent with their attitudes (for a 
list of arguments please see appendix E).  The names of each group explicitly stated their 
position on the issue. Participants were instructed to click on 8 of the 16 cells (Appendix 
F). Before clicking on a cell participants were asked to mimic the embodiment for ten 
seconds (Appendix G) When participants clicked on a cell it brought them to a separate 
screen which stated an argument (Appendix H) and then participants were allowed to rate 
the argument from 1-100 using a sliding scale (Appendix I).  Following it would bring 
them back to the matrix (Appendix J) 
Selective Exposure.    Selective exposure was measured by how many congruent 
arguments participants chose from the matrix, with a maximum of 8 and a minimum of 0.   
Thus selective exposure is indicated by higher amounts of congruent versus incongruent 
searching.   
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Biased Assimilation.  Biased assimilation was measured by the average ratings 
participants gave to congruent arguments (e.g. arguments in favour of the issue, when the 
participants were in favour of the issue or arguments against the issue when participants 
were against the issue) versus the average ratings of incongruent arguments. Participant 
position will be used to denote whether participants are in favour or against the issue (e.g. 
in favour of capital punishment), whereas argument direction will denote whether the 
argument was in favour or against the issue.   Larger differences between congruent and 
incongruent ratings are indicative of biased assimilation.   It should also be noted that 
analyses are collapsed across topics and pro-choice was grouped with‘against’ and pro-
life grouped with the‘in favour’ arguments.   
Disconfirmation Bias.  Unbeknownst to participants, the time it took for 
participants to read each argument was measured.  The disconfirmation bias was 
measured as a function of average time taken to read congruent arguments versus average 
time of incongruent arguments.  Longer times indicate that people are spending more 
time and more cognitive resources trying to mentally counter argue the incongruent 
arguments.  Time was recorded until participants indicated their rating of the argument. 
Selective Recall.  Participants were given a surprise recall task and asked to recall 
as many of the arguments as they could.  Two coders independently coded responses for 
congruent (α = .95) and incongruent arguments (α = .94).  Participants also occasionally 
wrote comments and additional arguments not listed.  Coders independently coded these 
arguments (α = .86). Coders subsequently met to discuss the discrepancies.  Average 
recall frequency was calculated by taking the number of arguments recalled and dividing 
it by the number of arguments viewed for each position (e.g. individuals who selected 5 
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arguments in favour of the issue but recalled 2 of them would be given a score of 0.4). 
Selective recall is measured by a difference in congruent arguments recalled versus 
incongruent arguments recalled. 
Attitude polarization. Participants’ attitudes measured at the beginning of the 
information matrix were subtracted from time their attitudes at the end of the matrix task.  
Positive values indicate attitude polarization.     
Procedure 
 Participants were greeted by an experimenter and then were asked to read the 
letter of information and sign the consent form. All participants were tested individually 
in a closed room with a single computer.   After signing the consent form participants 
began the experiment.  The first task was the sentence completion task and 
authoritarianism measure used to identify a participant’s uncertainty orientation, followed 
by the demographic questionnaire.  
 Following this first task participants were told that the second part of the 
experiment was meant to examine multi-tasking and decision making.  Participants were 
told that they would be mimicking a motion while reading some material and answering 
questions.  Participants were randomly assigned to the ‘up’ or ‘down’ embodiment 
condition.  An experimenter would then model the motion and ask participants to mimic 
it.  Special care was taken to make sure participants were doing it correctly, but without 
giving any indication that it resembled the balancing gesture.  Experimenters would 
ensure participants were doing it correctly before leaving, correcting participants if they 
were moving too quickly or slowly or if their hands were not in the correct position (e.g. 
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hands vertical, or palms partially closed).   Participants were told that the computer will 
prompt them when they need to mimic the motion by stating “please mimic the motion 
until this disappears” 
 After being given the embodiment condition, the experimenter would leave the 
room and participants would begin the next task on the computer.  Participants first chose 
a personally important issue (Appendix K) and completed the attitude measures which 
measured their initial attitude strength and their perceived knowledge.   Participants were 
then told that in the next task they would see a 4 x 4 matrix and would be allowed to 
choose 8 of the 16 boxes.   They were then shown what the matrix looked like and it was 
explained that 2 of the rows contained arguments in favour of their ‘topic of choice’ 
(topic of choice would be replaced with the actual topic that they chose e.g. same-sex 
marriage) and 2 of the rows contained arguments against their topic of choice.    
 Participants then began the information board task.  Participants would be 
prompted with a yellow box stating “please mimic the motion until this message 
disappears.”  The yellow box would stay on the screen for 10 seconds. Participants would 
be able to see the information board, but were unable to click on a box until the message 
disappeared (Appendix G).  Once the box disappeared, participants could select a box at 
which point an argument would be viewed.   Above the argument there was a prompt that 
told participants to mimic the motion while they read the argument.   Once participants 
read the argument they would be able to click ‘next’, at which point they would rate the 
argument, measured on a scale of 1 (very weak argument) to 100 (very strong argument).  
 Once participants indicated their rating of the argument, they would be brought 
back to the initial 4 x 4 matrix.  Once again a yellow box prompting participants to mimic 
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the motion would be displayed for 10 seconds.  The only difference would be that the box 
they selected in the first round would now be crossed out (Appendix J).  Participants 
would select another box and then read and evaluate the argument.  They would repeat 
this process for a total of 8 times.   
 Following the information board task, participants were asked what their attitudes 
towards the issue were, once again on a 1-100 scale (1 = indifferent, 100 = extremely 
strong).  Participants then completed a short filler task from another study (an evaluative 
conditioning task, Olson & Fazio, 2004) and then were asked to recall as many arguments 
from the information board matrix as they could, regardless of whether they agreed or 
disagreed with them.  Following the recall, participants were given a few suspicion 
questionnaires and also asked to recall which rows were in the information board were in 
favour of their issue and which rows were against the issue.  Participants were then 
thanked for their participation in the study, given a debriefing sheet, and were thoroughly 
debriefed. 
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Dataset 
Uncertainty orientation was calculated by subtracting the standardized F-scale 
scores from the standardized uncertainty scores, resulting in a standardized resultant 
measure of uncertainty.   Following the methodology outlined by the theory of 
uncertainty-orientation (Sorrentino et al., 1992), a tertile split of the data was performed.  
The top third of the sample were classified as UOs (n = 57), with 30 in the ‘down’ 
condition and 27 in the ‘up’ condition.  The bottom third of the sample were classified as 
COs (n =58), with 30 in the ‘down’ condition and 28 in the ‘up’ condition.  The middle 
third, known as moderates were excluded on the basis that they typically exhibit 
inconsistent patterns (Sorrentino et al., 1992; Sorrentino, 1977; Sorrentino, Smithson, 
Roney & Walker, 2003).  This resulted in a total of 115 participants, 81 women and 34 
men, between the ages of 17 and 35 (M = 18.66, SD = 1.96). 
Participants were free to choose the issue that was most important to them as well 
as the direction.  Examining only the included participants (i.e. UOs and COs), this 
resulted in 27 participants choosing same-sex marriage (4 against; 23 in favour), 36 
participants choosing abortion (24 pro-choice; 12 prolife), 44 choosing employment 
equity (1 against; 43 in favour), and 8 choosing capital punishment (3 against, 5 in 
favour).  The primary results are aggregated across all topics. 
To determine whether there were differences in topic selection between UOs and 
COs, chi-square analyses were examined across topic and whether they were in favour or 
against the topic.   No significant differences were found between topic and uncertainty 
orientation χ2 (3) = 3.32, p = .35, nor between uncertainty orientation and whether they 
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were in favour or against topics in general χ2 (1) = .78 , p = .37.   Furthermore, assessing 
each topic separately, no differences were found between uncertainty orientation and 
whether they were in favour or against the topic for employment equity, χ2 (1) = .71, p = 
.40, capital punishment, χ2 (1) = .04, p = .85,  andsame-sex marriage, χ2 (1) = .79, p = 
.37, but there were marginal differences for abortion; χ2 (1) = 3.60, p = .06, with 8 COs 
and 16 UOs being prochoice, whereas 8 COS and 4 UOs being prolife. 
Similarly, because the embodiment condition was given prior to choosing a topic, 
analyses were conducted to test for differences among the ‘up’ and ‘down’ condition. No 
differences were found between embodiment condition and topic χ2 (3) = .91p = .82, nor 
between embodiment and whether they were in favour or against χ2 (1) = .02, p = .90, nor 
for abortion, employment equity, capital punishment, or same-sex marriage, χ2 (1) = 
2.06p = .15,  χ2 (1) = .93,  p = .34, χ2 (1) = 1.43 p = .29, χ2 (1) = .06p = .93,  
respectively. 
Lastly it is important to note that those who exhibited the most biased searching, 
(e.g. chose 8 congruent arguments), were unable to be included in the biased assimilation 
or disconfirmation bias analyses.  This is because a repeated measures analysis requires 
data to be present for both variables, and these individuals (n = 5) who did not look at 
incongruent information do not have data for that side of the issue.  
Thus the analyses for biased assimilation and the disconfirmation bias can be viewed as 
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conservative
3
. Additionally, these 5individuals did not differ from the main sample 
across levels of the embodiment manipulation χ2 (1) = 1.62, p = .20 (4 and 1 for ‘down’ 
and ‘up’ respectively), or levels of uncertainty orientation χ2 (1) = .228,  p = .63 (2 and 3 
for COs and UOs respectively).  
Selective Exposure 
Primary Analyses. Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of interaction between 
uncertainty orientation and the embodiment conditions on selective exposure. As 
predicted, UOs selected fewer congruent arguments  (M = 4.26,SE = .24) in the ‘up’ 
condition than COs (M = 4.71, SE = .22) and this difference was greater than in the 
‘down’ condition  where UOs have higher selective exposure scores (M = 4.67, SE = .24), 
than COs (M = 4.63, SE = .22) conditions, A t-test of this pattern of interaction was not 
significant t (111) = 1.06, p =.29.Comparisons within this pattern of interaction revealed 
that there was a marginally significant difference for UOs versus COs in the ‘up’ 
condition, t (111) = 1.38, p = .09, one-tailed, but no difference in the down condition, t 
(111) = .11p = .46, one tailed.  
Additional analyses revealed no significant effects for the embodiment by 
uncertainty orientation interaction when controlling for attitude strength, F(1, 110) = 
.696, p = .41 or knowledge F (1, 110) = .54, p = .46.Examining the main effects, there 
                                                        
3
 It is suggested that those who chose only congruent arguments would be more biased than those who did 
not. Thus eliminating them would, if anything, show less of an effect . Follow up tests revealed that while 
the difference of ratings of arguments congruent with one’s position between individuals who chose all 
congruent arguments (M = 68.62, SD = 11.94), and participants who chose at least 1 incongruent argument 
(M = 66.73, SD =  14.66)was higher, it was not significant t (113) = -.28,  p = .78; However when 
examining the disconfirmation bias, participants that picked all congruent information were marginally  
significantly faster reading congruent arguments (M = 8.57, SD = 3.34) than those who chose at least 1 
incongruent argument (M = 13.84, SD = 6.84), t (113) = 1.70, p = .09 
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was no  
 
Figure 1. Shows the number of congruent arguments selected for UOs and COs for the 
‘up’ and ‘down’ embodiment conditions.  
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significant main effect of uncertainty F(1,111) = .85, p = .36, or embodiment condition  
F(1,111) = .51, p = .48. 
Additional Analyses.  Upon exploring some investigative analyses, a main effect 
of gender was discovered such that women selected more congruent information, (M  
4.73, SE = .15) than men (M = 4.21SE = .13)  t (113) = 2.125, p =.03. In addition, the 
pattern shown in Figure 1 appeared stronger for women than men
4
.  Figure 2 shows the 
pattern of interaction for females. UOs in the ‘up’ condition selected fewer congruent 
arguments (M = 4.21, SE = .30), than COs, (M = 5.11, SE = .31 and this difference was 
greater than in the down condition (M = 4.76, SE = .29) for  UOs vs. COs (M = 4.83, SE 
= .28).  A one-way test of the pattern of interaction revealed a marginally significant 
interaction t (79) = 1.42, p = .08.  Examining the interaction reveals that UOs in the ‘up’ 
condition selected significantly fewer congruent arguments than COs in the ‘up' condition 
t (79) =  2.08, p = .02, one-tailed, but not in the down condition t (79) = .15, p = .44, one-
tailed.   
 Overall Effects.  An analysis was conducted to examine whether, overall, 
participants selectively exposed themselves to information they agreed with.  A t-test 
between the average number of congruent arguments selected (M = 4.57, SD = 1.22) 
against a mean of 4 (the number of congruent arguments selected if selection was 
random) revealed a significant selective exposure effect t(114) = 5.04, p < .001.   
Additionally the number of congruent arguments significantly correlated with the amount 
                                                        
4
 The interaction between embodiment condition, uncertainty orientation and gender was non-significant F 
(1, 107) = .60, p = .44.  Examining gender for the other dependent variables revealed no meaningful effects. 
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of self-perceived knowledge, r = .22, p =.02 and marginally with initial attitude strength 
r=.18, p =.06.  It should also be noted that gender did note correlate with initial attitude 
strength or knowledge r = -.12, p =.20   and r = .14, p =.13 respectively. 
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Figure 2.Shows the number of congruent arguments selected for UOs and COs for the 
‘up’ and ‘down’ embodiment conditions.  for women only   
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Biased Assimilation 
Primary Analyses.  Figure 3depicts the results associated with the main 
hypothesis that UOs would express less biased assimilation in the ‘up’ versus ‘down’ 
condition as compared to COs.  A repeated measures analysis was conducted examining 
the effect of participant’s position, embodiment condition and uncertainty orientation on 
arguments for and against as the repeated measures variable.  The analysis revealed a 
non-significant four-way interaction, F(1, 102) = .808, p = .37.Controlling for attitude 
strength and knowledge, this interaction remains non-significant, F(1, 100) = .62, p = 
.44.   
For a summary of all means and standard deviations across each condition please see 
Table 1.   Examining main effects, there were no significant main effects of argument 
position, F (1, 102) = .03, p = .96,uncertainty-orientation F (1, 102) = .59, p = .45, 
embodiment condition F (1, 102) = .60, p = .44.   
Overall Effects.   To test whether participants showed biased assimilated of the 
information, a repeated measures analysis was conducted on the average argument 
strength for arguments in favour of the issue and the average argument strength for 
arguments against the issue between participant position.  The analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between whether participants were in favour or against the issue 
and whether the argument was in favour or against the issue F(1, 108) = 53.39, p < .001, 
such that participants in favour of the issue rated arguments in favour of the issue (M = 
66.41, SD = 14.99) higher than arguments against (M = 42.92, SD= 22.46), t(35)
5
 = 5.01, 
                                                        
5
Levene’s test violated, F(1,108) = 9.50, p = .004 
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p < .001,  and those who were against the issue rated arguments against the issue (M =  
 
 
 
Figure 3.  The four way interaction between uncertainy orientation, the embodiment 
conditions, argument direction, and participant position on average argument ratings. 
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Table 1  
Means and standard deviations for congruent and incongruent argument ratings across 
argument direction and participant position on each level of uncertainty orientation and 
embodiment condition.  Higher numbers indicate higher average argument ratings. 
 
 
 
 
Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant 
Against 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant 
Against 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
UOs & Up 61.66 (11.49) 50.70 (14.94) 35.74 (17.91) 66.10 (18.00) 
UOs & Down 64.72 (19.88) 36.88 (21.42) 33.56 (19.90) 69.60 (10.07) 
COs & Up 70.55 (13.44) 42.62 (29.27) 51.00 (26.52) 66.17 (16.94) 
COs & Down 68.17 (14.20) 46.25 (27.26) 49.20 (20.66) 68.74 (12.75) 
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69.01, SD = 16.28), higher than arguments in favour of the issue (M = 43.44, SD = 
22.71), t(92)
6
 = 7.16, p < .001.  Furthermore, there were no differences between average 
ratings in favour (M = 54.92, SD = 19.90) or against (M = 55.35, SE = 2.21) the issue, F 
(1, 104) = .014, p = .91 (Figure 4). 
 
Disconfirmation Bias  
Primary Analyses.   Figure 5 reveals the pattern of interactions across 
embodiment and uncertainty conditions on time spent reading arguments.  Examining the 
hypothesis that UOs would exhibit a greater reduction in bias in the ‘up’ versus ‘down’ 
condition compared to COs, a repeated measures analysis was conducted examining the 
effect of participant’s position, embodiment condition and uncertainty orientation on time 
spent reading arguments for and against the issues.  The test of this pattern of interaction 
was non-significant,  F (1, 102) = .05, p = .85.This interaction remains non-significant 
when controlling for time spent reading the instructions, F (1, 101) = .06, p = .80, initial 
attitude strength,F (1, 101) = .05, p = .83, or perceived knowledge, F (1, 101) = .04, p = 
.84.  In addition, there was no main effect of uncertainty orientation F (1, 102) = 
1.14, p = .29 or embodiment condition F (1, 102) = .53, p = .47.    For a list of all means 
and standard deviations across each condition please see Table 2.    
It should be noted that the arguments for employment equity were taken from the 
Taber and Lodge (2006) study.  As such, they were considerably longer than the other 
arguments and thus participants spent longer reading them (M =19.35, SD = 6.52) than  
                                                        
6
Levene’s test violated, F(1,108) = 8.45, p = .003 
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Figure 4. Overall biased assimilation examining argument direction, and participant 
position on average argument ratings.  
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Figure 5.  The four way interaction examining time spent reading between uncertainy 
orientation, the embodiment conditions, argument direction, and participant position for 
all topics. Time is measured in seconds.  
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Table 2 
Means and standard deviations for time spent reading for congruent and incongruent 
argument ratings across argument direction and participant position on each level of 
uncertainty orientation and embodiment condition.  Time is measured in seconds. 
 
 
 
  
 
Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant 
Against 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant 
Against 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
UOs & Up 14.50 (6.24) 9.10 (2.45) 19.17 (9.72) 10.22 (2.52) 
UOs & Down 15.07 (7.16) 9.66 (2.77) 15.71 (7.84) 9.19 (1.81) 
COs & Up 15.13 (6.80) 10.52 (4.71) 16.49 (8.34) 11.78 (6.74) 
COs & Down 15.07 (8.80) 7.96 (1.66) 17.8 (11.66) 11.93 (3.63) 
63 
 
 
 
the other arguments (M = 10.06, SD = 3.93), t(62) = 8.47, p < .001, Levene’s test 
violated, F(1,113) = 8.04p =.005.  Because participants chose an overwhelming majority 
of in favour arguments for employment equity, this resulted in a significant main effect of 
argument type time for argument in favour, F (1, 102) = 9.13, p = .003.  As such, 
analyses were re-examined without employment equity.   
Additional Analyses.   Removing employment equity from the analysis still 
reveals a non-significant pattern of interaction F(1, 58) = .02, p  = .88 (See Figure 6), and 
the effect of argument position becomes marginal,  F(1, 58) = 3.52, p  = .07.  however 
this becomes non-significant when controlling for time reading for instructions F(1, 57) = 
2.20 , p  = .14. 
The main effect of embodiment condition was non-significant F(1, 58) = .002, p 
= .97, as was uncertainty orientation, F(1, 58) = 1.81, p = .18.   In addition the four way 
pattern of interaction remains nonsignificant when controlling for time reading 
instructions F(1, 57) = .10, p = .76.   
Overall Effects.  To test whether participants exhibited an overall 
disconfirmation bias, a repeated measures analysis was conducted on the average time 
spent reading arguments in favour of the issue and the average time spent reading for 
arguments against the issue across participant position.  The results showed no evidence 
of a disconfirmation bias, F (1, 108) = .99, p = .32 and remains non-significant when 
removing employment equity F(1, 64) = .84, p = .36.  In addition, the effect remains non-
significant when controlling for time reading instructions F(1, 107) = .96, p = .33 and 
F(1, 63) = .71, p = .40 for the entire sample and when removing employment equity 
respectively. 
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Figure 6.  The four way interaction examining time spent reading between uncertainy 
orientation, the embodiment conditions, argument direction, and participant position 
without arguments for or against employment equity. Time is measured in seconds  
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Table 3.  
 
Means and standard deviations for time spent reading for congruent and incongruent 
argument ratings across argument direction and participant position on each level of 
uncertainty orientation and embodiment condition without employment equity.  Time is 
measured in seconds. 
 
 Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant 
Against 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant 
Against 
 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
UOs & Up 10.53 (3.43) 9.10 (2.44) 11.67 (3.91) 10.22 (2.52) 
UOs & Down 11.42 (5.85) 9.66 (2.76) 11.20 (4.79) 9.20 (1.81) 
COs & Up 10.38 (2.97) 8.90 (2.14) 9.66 (2.73) 10.61 (6.56) 
COs & Down 8.04 (3.28) 7.96 (1.67) 9.19 (4.81) 11.93 (3.63) 
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Selective Recall 
Primary Analyses. Figure 7 shows the pattern of interaction across each 
condition of embodiment and uncertainty orientation for recall of congruent and 
incongruent arguments. Examining the hypothesis that selective recall would interact 
with the embodiment condition and uncertainty orientation showed no significant 
interaction F(1, 102) = .08, p = 79.   In addition, the main effect of uncertainty 
orientation was not significant F(1, 102) = 1.02p = .31,nor that of embodiment condition  
F(1, 102) = .16, p = .61.For a summary of all means and standard deviations across each 
condition please see Table 4 
Overall Effects of Selective Recall.   Figure 8 shows the pattern of interaction 
for the overall effects of selective recall.  A repeated measures analysis was conducted on 
arguments recalled (in favour and against) between individuals who declared themselves 
as in favour or against the issue.   The results showed evidence of selective recall, F (1, 
108) = 12.36,p = .001.  Examining post-hoc tests reveal that individuals who were in 
favour of the issue recalled significantly more arguments against the issue (M =.38, SD = 
.37), than arguments for the issue (M = .20, SD = .21). t(33) = 2.38,  p = .02, Levene’s 
test violated F(1,108) = 31.45, p< .001.  However, although those who were against the 
position didrecall more arguments in favour (M =.30, SD = .30), than arguments against 
(M =.23, SD = .25), this difference was not significant t (108) = 1.103,  p = .27.  
Furthermore, there was no main effect of argument position F (1, 108) = .50,p = .48. 
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Figure 7.  The four way interaction examining average arguments recalled between 
uncertainy orientation, the embodiment conditions, argument direction, and participant 
position across all topics. Number of arguments recalled is divided by number of 
arguments viewed.  
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Table 4 
Means and standard deviations for average arguments recalled for congruent and 
incongruent argument ratings across argument direction and participant position on 
each level of uncertainty orientation and embodiment condition.  Number of arguments 
recalled is divided by number of arguments viewed.   
 
 Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument In 
Favour & 
Participant 
Against 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant In 
favour 
Argument  
Against & 
Participant 
Against 
 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
UOs & Up .23 (.25) .39 (.43) .29 (.27) .20 (.21) 
UOs & Down .33 (.21) .46 (.42) .40 (.30) .18 (.18) 
COs & Up .17 (.17) .17 (.24) .30 (.33) .23 (.29) 
COs & Down .11 (.16) .50 (.37) .23 (.31) .37 (.30) 
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Figure 8.  Interaction between argument direction and participant position for selective 
recall.  
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Attitude Polarization 
Primary Analyses.  Figure 9, depicts the overall interaction between attitude 
polarization between uncertainty orientation and embodiment on attitude polarization, 
when initial attitudes are covaried.  As can be seen, only the UOs in the ‘up’ condition 
showed any sort of depolarization of attitudes (M = -1.92, SD = 10.85) whereas COs 
showed the greatest polarization of attitudes  (M = 5.21, SD = 15.52) with the difference 
between UOs and COs greater than in the down condition, (M = 2.23, SD = 13.35 and M 
= 4.37, SD = 12.22 for UOs and COs respectively). 
 A one-tailed t-test of the predicted pattern of interaction was significant, t (111) = 
1.90, p = .04.  Tests reveal that UOs differ significant from COs in the ‘up’ condition  t 
(111) = 2.36, p = .01, one-tailed, but not in the down condition t (111) = .26, p = .80.In 
testing for overall effects, there was no significant main effect of embodiment condition  
F(1,111) = .46, p = .50 but  there was a marginally significant main effect of uncertainty 
F(1,111) = 3.59, p = .06 with UOs polarizing less overall (M = .26, SD = 12.30) than 
COs (M = 4.78, SD = 13.80) . 
 Overall Effects of Attitude Polarization.  To examine whether participants 
exhibited attitude polarization, participants’ initial attitudes (M = 63.36, SD = 24.37) and 
their attitudes at the end of the information board task (M = 65.90, SD = 21.99), were 
compared using a paired t-test t (113) = -2.060, p =.04, indicating an overall attitude 
polarization effect.    
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Figure 9.  Analysis of the interaction of attitude polarization between uncertainty 
orientation and embodiment manipulation.  Attitude polarization is depicted as a 
difference score between initial attitude strength subtracted from attitude strength 
following the information board task.   
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DISCUSSION 
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Overall, the results testing the general hypothesis were weak.  In most instances 
results trended in the hypothesized direction, but they often failed to reach significance.  
Two results, however, do offer encouragement for future research. The first was with 
respect to attitude polarization.  Uncertainty-Oriented individuals show a greater 
reduction in their attitudes than COs  in the  ‘up’ embodiment condition, and this 
difference was greater than in the down condition.  
 A second point of encouragement is that the predicted uncertainty orientation x 
embodiment interaction did work for females. Here UOs paid more attention to 
incongruent information than COs in the ‘up’ condition and this difference was 
significantly greater than in the ‘down’ condition. Although males showed the same 
pattern of interaction, it was not a significant effect. Taken together, it is possible that 
with a larger sample size, we may have obtained a significant effect for selective 
exposure and several of the other measures.  
 Another possibility for weak effects follows from the inconsistency between this 
work and that by  Lee and Schwarz, (2012) who found effects using the ‘up’ 
manipulation but not in the neutral or ‘down’ condition.  These investigators examined 
making a decision between different products or between allocating time between work 
and leisure  It is possible that there may exist a fundamental difference between the 
balance that exists between making a consumption decision versus the balance that exists 
when processing information.  For example, when making a choice people may want 
balance in the sense that they give choices equal weight, but when balancing when 
processing information, people may want to fairly view and interpret the information. 
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 The results with attitude polarization and selective exposure (with women)   
follows from the conceptualizations of embodied cognition as similar to that of goal 
priming.  Under this view, embodiment manipulations interact with one’s own 
motivation, which suggests that bodily feedback is more flexible than is currently 
theorized.   However, the way in which embodiment interacts with an individual 
motivation is still unclear.  One possibility is due to the recognition that embodiment, and 
individual differences in motivation both work through construct accessibility 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002; Higgins & King, 1981; Bargh & Pratto, 1986), Thus the balance 
prime can be more fluently incorporated into individuals who have greater accessibility 
towards resolving uncertainty, resulting in UOs being more affected by the manipulation 
than COs.   Regardless, individual differences appear to have an important effect 
regarding embodiment findings and as such research focusing on individual differences is 
necessary for a full understanding of embodied cognition and conceptual metaphor 
theory.   Future research may seek to examine this interaction in a CO-centric society, 
such as Japan, to determine whether this embodiment effect interacts with one’s mode of 
processing. COs in this environment may tend to seek more congruent arguments, with 
UOs being relatively unaffected.    
In addition, it is interesting that there was no main effect of uncertainty 
orientation.  One reason for this may stem from the idea that  the ‘down’ condition may 
have served as the embodiment manipulation and interacted with uncertainty orientation 
in different ways.  The motion of alternately moving one’s hands ‘down’ can also be 
thought of as embodying avoidance, in that the motion is similar to pushing something 
away.  One of the earliest studies by Solarz (1960) has now been interpreted as an 
75 
 
 
 
embodiment finding, providing some evidence for this argument.  In this study, 
participants were given words like smart, stupid, or happy, and asked to either move a 
lever towards or away from themselves.  Participants were faster moving the lever 
towards themselves for positive words than for negative words and faster moving the 
lever away from themselves for negative words.  These results were also replicated and 
then extended by Chen and Bargh (1999) who also showed that the same effects occur 
even when participants are not evaluating the stimuli (e.g. they are always pulling or 
always pushing).  Since the motion of pushing away is related to avoidance of negative 
stimuli, this may have interacted with UOs and activated avoidance concepts which 
inherently primed UOs to avoid incongruent information.  As such, UOs who may 
normally have expressed less bias than COs, became more avoidant under the ‘down’ 
condition and as such expressed similar amounts of bias to COs.  
 Lastly, this research adds to the wealth of research on the biasing effect of 
attitudes on information processing.  Participants tended to selectively expose themselves 
to information and this effect was greater the more self-perceived knowledge one had or 
the stronger one’s attitudes.  Participants also weighed information they agreed with as 
stronger than information they disagreed.  They also recalled more incongruent 
information on average, than congruent information, which demonstrates expectancy 
violations and a tendency to spend more time on incongruent information (Eagly, Chen, 
Chaiken, & Shaw-Barnes, 1999; Edwards and Smith).  Lastly participants exhibited a  
significant attitude polarization effect. 
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Limitations and Future Directions.      It should be noted that Lee and Schwarz 
(June 2
nd
, 2011 Personal Communication) had two control conditions (the hands ‘down’ 
condition, and a hands ‘up’ but stationary), however they did not find any differences 
between the two conditions. In addition, the present research was mainly interested in 
whether UOs would differ from COs in the balanced condition as opposed to the non-
balanced condition. As such it was opted to only use one control to increase power. 
Furthermore, because the task in this study was cognitively demanding, it was thought 
that irrespective of an embodiment effect, the movement of one’s hands would be 
disrupting and depleting.  Indeed, many participants in debriefing and in suspicions 
questions noted that they were distracted.  As such, it was thought that a completely 
neutral condition or the stationary hands ‘up’ condition would not provide a suitable 
control for this task.  It may be wondered why Lee and Schwarz did not find effects 
between the two control condition.  One reason could be that those experiments did not 
take into account uncertainty orientation, which appear to play an interacting role 
between the ‘up’ and ‘down’ condition and as such may explain why no effects were 
found. 
In addition, it may be wondered why there is no main effect of the embodiment 
manipulation.  Two reasons are suggested.  The first is that previous research using this 
manipulation did not take into account uncertainty orientation, which appears to have 
differing impacts on UOs and COs.  As such, it is possible that other samples had a 
greater percentage of uncertainty-orientated individuals.  The second is that a number of 
participants were unable to recall which rows were congruent with their views and which 
rows were not following the information board task, suggesting that they were not 
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involved with the task.  When eliminating these participants, analyses do reveal a 
significant main effect of embodiment condition 
A limitation in this study was that participants were free to control many of the 
variables, for example, the topic they chose and the arguments they view.  In addition, 
participants varied widely with respect to their attitudes and knowledge, resulting in even 
greater variance.  The results often trended in the predicted direction or were significant 
for specific populations (e.g. women), however, this freedom may have weakened the 
statistical power of the manipulation.  Future studies may want to explore this effect of 
uncertainty orientation and embodiment using greater sample sizes or controlling 
attitudes and knowledge and the information participants view.  
Lastly, participants were given the opportunity to choose their own topic in order 
to keep personal relevance high for all participants.   Previous research has shown that 
uncertainty orientation interacts with personal relevance.  It is possible that if the topics 
were of low personal relevance, the interactions would have been reversed, with COs 
being more balanced in the ‘up’ condition.  Future research should examine manipulating 
personal relevance in order to better understand how the confirmation bias and 
embodying balance interacts with uncertainty orientation.  
 
Conclusion.    This paper sought to explore the moderating effect of uncertainty 
orientation and embodied metaphor on the confirmation bias.  In doing so, it attempted to 
contribute to the literature by examining ways to reduce the confirmation and explore 
mechanisms of embodied cognition through individual differences. Although the overall 
results are weak, what was found is suggestive of the factthat embodiment, like priming, 
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interacts with people’s inherent motivations. Future research will test this possibility and 
perhaps aid in understanding the underlying dynamics of embodied cognition and 
conceptual metaphor theory.  
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Appendix A 
nUncertainty – Thematic Apperception Test 
Instructions: 
You are going to see a series of sentences, and your task is to tell a story that is suggested 
to you by each sentence.  Try to imagine what is going on.  Then tell what the situation is, 
what led up to the situation, what the people are thinking and feeling, and what they will 
do.  
 
In other words, write as complete a story as you can--a story with plot and characters. 
 
You will have twenty (20) seconds to look at a sentence and then 4 minutes to write your 
story about it.  Write your first impressions and work rapidly.  I will keep time and tell 
you when it is time to finish your story and to get ready for the next sentence. 
 
There are no right or wrong stories or kinds of stories, so you may feel free to write 
whatever story is suggested to you when you look at a sentence.  Spelling, punctuation, 
and grammar are not important.  What is important is to write out as fully and as quickly 
as possible the story that comes into your mind as you imagine what is going on. 
 
Sentence Leads: 
a) Two people are working in a laboratory on a piece of equipment;  
(b)A person is sitting, wonder what may happen;  
(c)A person is seated at a desk with a computer and books; 
(d) An older person is talking to a young person. 
 
Questions 
1.  What is happening?  Who is (are) the person(s) 
2.  What has led up to this situation?  That is, what has happened in the past? 
3.  What is being thought?  What is wanted?  By whom? 
4.  What will happen?  What will be done? 
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Appendix B 
Authoritarianism F- scale 
 
+1:  I AGREE A LITTLE   -1:  I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
+2:  I AGREE SOMEWHAT   -2:  I DISAGREE SOMEWHAT 
+3:  I AGREE VERY MUCH  -3:  I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
 
1. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, 
gratitude and respect for his or her parents. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
2. An insult to our honour should always be punished. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
3. Books and movies ought not to deal so much with the unpleasant and seamy side 
of life;  they ought to concentrate on themes that are entertaining or uplifting. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
4. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will 
to work and fight for family and country. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
5. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or 
relative. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
6. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to 
get over them and settle down. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
 
 
7. The findings of science may someday show that many of our most cherished 
beliefs are wrong.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
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8. People ought to pay more attention to new ideas, even if they seem to go against 
the Canadian way of life.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
9. If people would talk less and work more everybody would be better off. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
10. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get 
along with decent people. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
11. Insults to our honour are not always important enough to bother about.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
12. It is right for people to raise questions about even the most sacred matters.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
13. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
learn. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
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14. There is no reason to punish any crime with the death penalty.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
15. Anyone who would interpret the Bible literally just doesn’t know much about 
geology, biology, or history.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
16. In this scientific age the need for a religious belief is more important than ever 
before. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
17. When they are little, kids sometimes think about doing harm to one or both of 
their parents. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
18. It is possible that creatures on other planets have founded a better society than 
ours.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
19. The prisoners in our corrective institutions, regardless of the nature of their crimes 
should be treated humanely.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
20. The sooner people realize that we must get rid of all traitors in the government, 
the better off we’ll be. 
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
21. Some of the greatest atrocities in history have been committed in the name of 
religion and morality.   
 
  +3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
 
What is your ethnicity? _____________ 
 
Place of birth: (what country were you born in)? ____________ 
 
What is your first language? _____________ 
 
How old are you? _______________ 
 
Are you Male or Female           Male         Female 
 
What is your Religion?   ________________ 
 
How religious are you?    
1 (Not Religious at all)     
2 (Slightly Religious)   
3 (Moderately Religious)   
4 (Quite Religious)       
5 (Very Religious)   
 
Do you consider yourself Right-wing, or Left-wing   1 (Left-wing)   2 (Right Wing)  3( 
Neither) 
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Appendix D 
4 x 4 Information Matrix 
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Appendix E 
List of Arguments For Each Topic 
Same-sex Marriage 
In favour 
Denying same sex marriage on the basis of religious grounds is a violation of religious 
freedoms.  Civil Law and religious opinions must remain kept separate. 
Marriage benefits, such as joint ownership, medical decision-making capacity, should be 
available to all couples. 
Homosexuality is an accepted lifestyle nowadays with most evidence strongly supporting 
biological causation. 
Denying these marriages is a form of minority discrimination. 
It doesn't hurt society or anyone in particular. 
The only thing that should matter in marriage is love. 
The number of child adoptions should increase since same-sex couples cannot pro-create  
It encourages people to have strong family values and give up high-risk sexual lifestyles. 
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Same-sex Marriage 
Against 
Marriages are for ensuring the continuation of the species. 
The same-sex lifestyle is not something to be encouraged, as a lot of research shows it 
leads to a much lower life expectancy, psychological disorders, and other problems. 
Same-sex marriage is bad for the children.   Children have been raised by a man and 
woman for thousands of years and allowing same sex marriages would be an untried 
social experiment 
Leaders of religious faiths (i.e. Pastors, Rabbis, etc.) would be forced to marry people, 
even if it conflicted with their religious beliefs.   
Same-sex relationships are immoral and violate the sacred institution of marriage 
according to many religions 
It weakens the definition and respect for the institution of marriage. 
It weakens the traditional family values essential to our society. 
It provides a slippery slope in the legality of marriage (e.g. having multiple wives or 
marrying an animal could be next). 
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Employment Equity 
In favour 
Some whites claim to be victims of Employment Equity programs. Nonsense! White 
Canadians have long benefited from a society biased toward white interests, so any 
current preferences for minorities are only fair. There are no victims of 
Employment Equity. Therefore, we should all support Employment Equity programs. 
The largest group of Canadians to benefit from Employment Equity thus far are women. 
Before 1964, women were excluded from many higher paying occupations and 
professions based on stereotype, custom and law. There were virtually no women police 
officers, lawyers, or doctors, for example. Progress has been made, but women still need 
Employment Equity programs. 
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits Employment Equity. In fact, the Supreme Court 
upheld Employment Equity programs in education in a landmark case. In this case, the 
Court explicitly stated that "Employment Equity is consistent with the Constitution. 
Who says racism is dead in America? Far from it. Surveys show that a majority of white 
Canadians still believe that African- and Latino Canadians are less intelligent, less hard 
working and less patriotic than whites. Employment Equity programs are an important 
step toward changing these racist attitudes. 
When a company with a history of past discrimination passes over a white man and hires 
a qualified minority or woman instead, that isn't "reverse discrimination." When black 
professional athletes were first hired, breaking the "color barrier" in sports, some white 
ballplayers lost job opportunities. But that was not "reverse discrimination," it was a first 
step toward ending discrimination. 
In the historic words of one Canadian leader, "America has given the Negropeople a bad 
check marked insufficient funds." It is about time that Canada makes good on its promise 
of opportunity for all. Employment Equity programs are a necessary first step toward 
racial equality in America. 
In 1990, the average black male worker earned just $731 for every $1,000 earned by a 
white male worker in a comparable position. Moreover, though white males make up 
only 43% of the workforce, they occupy 97% of Canada’s top executive positions. After 
decades of discrimination, only tough Employment Equity programs can level the playing 
field. 
Employment Equity programs are very effective. A study from the Clinton administration 
shows that the percentage of blacks entering the fields of law and medicine has 
increasedfrom less than 2% to over 10% in the past 20 years. Employment Equity is 
working. 
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Employment Equity 
Against 
Employment Equity plans treat people based on race, not past or present circumstances. 
Middle class blacks are given preferences while lower class whites are not! This is unfair 
reverse discrimination and is itself a form of racism. Employment Equity programs must 
stop. 
Many of the victims of Employment Equity are Asian-Canadians who have been 
excluded from top schools due to racial quotas. But they had no role at all in the country's 
history of discrimination against blacks and they are truly innocent victims! Employment 
Equity programs are doing more harm than good. 
According to a prominent African-Canadian economist, under Employment Equity, 
blacks often get admitted into schools and programs even though they have worse 
credentials than most white applicants. As a result, their dropout rate is higher. 
Employment Equityplans harm both blacks and whites and should be stopped. 
The Constitution absolutely prohibits racial discrimination, including Employment 
Equity. As one landmark case declared, "our Constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Therefore, Employment Equity plans are 
unconstitutional.  
The preeminent African-American leader of all time put it best: "Men should be judged 
by the content of their character, not the color of their skin." Clearly this statement 
recognizes the injustice of any form of racial preferences. In other words, even one of the 
most famous black leaders in history is opposed Employment Equity! 
Merit has always been the most important factor determining success in this country. 
People of all races and classes can get ahead if they are willing to work. Unfortunately, 
some Canadians expect to be handed a free lunch. Opportunities exist for all, but you 
have to be willing to pull your weight. Employment Equity violates the merit principle 
and should be ended. 
In a recent national poll, 50% of Canadians said they oppose Employment Equity. It 
seems  that most of our laws these days favour minorities, and Canadians are getting fed 
up. If a majority of Canadian citizens believe that Employment Equity programs are 
unfair, then why have these laws not been repealed? End Employment Equity now! 
Employment Equity programs at Canadian universities "stigmatize" African Canadians 
and other minority students who are assumed to be incompetent because they were 
admitted based on color, not on merit. Individuals, whether black or white, are far more 
likely to be successful if they prove their abilities in equal competition rather than 
receiving unfair and unearned advantages. Employment Equity works to the disadvantage 
of minorities. 
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Abortion 
Pro-Life 
Abortion is a form of murder and demeans the value of human life. 
Other birth control is readily available; thus, abortion shouldn’t be a form of birth control. 
The societal contributions of a potentially valuable human being are wiped out. 
Women who have abortions and the father of the child often suffer major psychological 
damage from the experience. 
The advances of genetic testing may lead to parents simply abortion babies for 
inconsequential reasons like hair colour. 
There are many couples who spend years on waiting lists trying to adopt a child. 
The abortion decision is often made by minors or young adults, who don’t have the 
maturity and life experiences to make good decisions. 
People have the right not to see their tax dollars go to something they find immoral 
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Abortion 
 
Pro-choice 
 
Abortion laws would allow the government to enforce laws over how woman control 
their bodies 
 If Abortion was illegal “Back alley” abortions would increase if it were made illegal, 
leading to increased risk of young women dying or becoming sterile. 
It’s arguably better for society to have babies aborted than have them be brought up poor 
and neglected, where not only will the child suffer but society when that child develops a 
higher attraction to crime, welfare, etc. 
A pregnancy could be only one mistake and could force a woman into a situation she 
does not want to be in which will affect both her and her child.   
Abortion is not murder because it is performed before a fetus has developed cognitive 
abilities. 
Having to give a baby up for adoption is more emotionally damaging than abortion. 
Pregnancy can be a medical risk.  It is not fair to force a woman to undergo such a risk. 
Some women who get pregnant are not mature enough to have a child as often they are 
just children themselves.  We should allow everyone to have a full life and mature before 
having children. 
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Capital Punishment 
In Favour  
DNA testing and other methods of modern crime scene science can now effectively 
eliminate almost all uncertainty as to a person’s guilt or innocence. 
Capital punishment permanently removes the worst criminals from society and from the 
prison system and is therefore much safer for us than long term or permanent 
incarceration. 
It helps eliminate the problem of overpopulation in the prison system. 
It gives prosecutors another bargaining chip in the plea bargain process, which is 
essential in cutting costs in an overcrowded court system. 
The death penalty gives closure to the victim’s families who have suffered so much. 
Capital punishment is the best form of crime deterrent  
Our justice system shows more sympathy for criminals than criminals do their victims. 
It provides a deterrent for prisoners already serving a life sentence. 
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Capital Punishment 
Against  
Financial costs to taxpayers of capital punishment are several times that of keeping 
someone in prison for life. 
It is barbaric and violates the “cruel and unusual” clause in the Bill of Rights. 
The endless appeals and required additional procedures clog our court system. 
We as a society have to move away from the “eye for an eye” revenge mentality if 
civilization is to advance. 
It sends the wrong message: How can we justify murder as a punishment for murder? 
Life in prison is a worse punishment and a more effective deterrent. 
Other countries (especially in Europe) would have a more favourable image of Canada. 
Some jury members are reluctant to convict if it means putting someone to death. 
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Appendix F: Matrix Instructions 
In the following task you will be shown a 4 x 4 Matrix.  Two of the rows contain 
arguments from associations that are for (same-sex marriage) and two rows contain 
arguments from associations that are against (same-sex marriage).  Please take this time 
to become familiar with the matrix (Matrix was shown).   
You will be allowed to choose 8 boxes.  You may choose any 8 you wish in any order 
you would like. 
Prior to this activity, the experimenter showed you a hand motion.  We would like you to 
mimic this action while you are thinking about which box to choose.  A yellow display 
box will be presented with the words “Please mimic the hand motion until this 
disappears.”  Please continue mimicking the hand motion for the duration of the yellow 
box.   
We would like you to also do the motion while you are reading the argument you have 
chosen. 
Remember, you will be allowed to choose 8 boxes and may choose any 8 in any order 
you would like.   
When you are ready please click continue 
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Appendix G 
Matrix with Embodiment Manipulation Prompt 
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Appendix H 
Argument Example 
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Appendix I 
Argument Rating Example 
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Appendix J 
Matrix Argument Selection:  
Example Prior to Selecting the Fourth Argument 
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Appendix K 
 
Topic Selection 
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Appendix L: Ethics Approval Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Jeff Rotman 
 
Education and Degrees 
Masters of Science, Social Psychology (in progress) University of Western Ontario.  
Honours, Bachelor of Science, Psychology.  Minor in Biology, University of Guelph (2009) 
 
Publications  
Rotman, J., Ye, Y., Sorrentino, R., Szeto, A., Dalke, K., Yoshida, E. (2012) Uncertainty 
Orientation and the Influence of Implicit Cultural Norms versus Personal Attitudes on Eating 
Behavior. MindPad, 1, 16-20 
 
Conference Presentations and Posters 
Rotman, J., Ye, Y., Sorrentino, R. (2012) On the One Hand , and on the Other: The Effect of 
Embodying Balance and Uncertainty Orientation on the Confirmation Bias.  Poster presented at 
the Annual meeting for the Society for the Study of Motivation (SSM), Chicago, Il, May 24
th
, 
2012. 
 
Rotman, J., Ye, Y., Sorrentino, R. (2012) On the One Hand, and on the Other: The Effect of 
Embodying Balance and Uncertainty Orientation on the Confirmation Bias.  Poster presented at 
the Annual Western-Waterloo Conference for Social Psychology, London, On, May 10
th
, 2012.  
 
Rotman, J., Ye, Y., Sorrentino, R., Szeto, A. (2012)Uncertainty Orientation and the Influence of 
Implicit Cultural Norms versus Personal Attitudes on Eating Behavior.  Poster presented for 
Society of Personality and Social Psychology, San Diego, California, January 26-28, 2012 
 
Rotman, J., Esses, V., That’s So Gay: (2012) This Poster Is So Gay: .The Relation Between 
Attitudes Towards Homosexuals and The Use of the Expression ‘That’s so Gay’ Poster presented 
for the Society of Personality and Social Psychology, San Diego, California, January 26-28, 2012 
 
Yang, Y., Rotman, J., Sorrentino, R., Dalke, K., Szeto, A. (2012) The Effects of Uncertainty 
Orientation and the Priming of Feeling versus Knowing on Attitudes towards Canadians and 
Americans, Poster presented for Society of Personality and Social Psychology, San Diego, 
California, January 26-28, 2012. 
Rotman, J., Meegan, D. (2009) The Effects of Reconsolidation on Negative Transfer and 
Proactive Interference in Humans.  Paper presented at the Undergraduate Thesis Conference, 
Guelph, Ontario, April 14
th
, 2009.   
 
Milhausen, R. R., Sakaluk, J., Todd, L., Rotman, J., Lachowsky, N., LeBlanc, L., Spring, L., 
Morrow, E., Laroque, A., and the Undergraduate Research Group in Sexuality. Booty calls, friends 
with benefits, and fuck buddies: The new “rules” for casual sex among Canadian university 
students. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of 
Sexuality’s Annual Meeting, San Juan, Puerto Rico, November 5-9, 2008. 
 
Awards, Honours, and Research Funding 
Ontario Graduate Scholarship, Government of Ontario, (2011-2012) Value: $15,000. 
Nominated for Graduate Student Teaching Award (2011 & 2012)  
Joseph-Armand Bombardier grant, SSHRC (2010 – 2011) Value: $17,500 
 
